The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction by Driesen, David M. & Ghosh, Shubha
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
College of Law Faculty - Scholarship College of Law 
2005 
The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction 
David M. Driesen 
Syracuse University. College of Law 
Shubha Ghosh 
University of Wisconsin Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub 
 Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Environmental Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Driesen, David M. and Ghosh, Shubha, "The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction" (2005). College of Law Faculty - Scholarship. 28. 
https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub/28 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at SURFACE. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in College of Law Faculty - Scholarship by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, 
please contact surface@syr.edu. 
DISTRIBUTING THE COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND
SAFETY PROTECTION:
THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND
REGULATORY REFORM
David M. Driesen
Syracuse University College of Law
E.I. White Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
(315) 443-4218
ddriesen@law.syr.edu
March 1, 2004
© David M. Driesen 2004.
DISTRIBUTING THE COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND
SAFETY PROTECTION:
THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND
REGULATORY REFORM
DAVID M. DRIESEN 
ABSTRACT
This article offers a normative theory justifying the feasibility
principle found in many environmental statutes.  It then uses this theory
to shine light on the regulatory reform debate.  
The feasibility principle avoids widespread plant shutdowns while
maximizing the stringency of regulation that does not have this outcome. 
The feasibility principle a reasonable democratically chosen
response to distributional concerns and provides meaningful guidance
regarding both maximum and minimum stringency.  Pollution’s
tendency to concentrate severe harms upon randomly selected pollution
victims justifies this approach’s stringency.  Normally, cost concerns
cannot justify failure to protect people from death, illness, and ecological
destruction.  But the principle’s constraints apply in the one situation
where some initial restraint might be justified, when regulation threatens
to produce widespread shutdowns that concentrate significant harms on
individuals.  Widely distributed costs, the type that obtain when plant
closures are not likely, have de minimus impacts that cannot justify
allowing death, serious illness, and ecological destruction to continue
unabated..    
Leading advocates of regulatory cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
agree that the distribution of costs and benefits matters to regulation. 
They continue to endorse CBA, which does nothing to address those
concerns, because they see the alternative to CBA as regulation without
any analysis or meaningful guiding principles.  The feasibility principle,
however, relies upon rational analysis, offers more meaningful guidance
than CBA, and has the capacity to advance CBA supporters’ goals better
than CBA does, and at much less cost.  
Advocates of CBA have distorted the debate about regulatory
reform by portraying it as a debate about whether or not cost receives
consideration.  Analysis of the feasibility principle shows that
consideration of cost has always pervaded the regulatory system.  Much
of the debate should concern how we address costs, not only whether
agencies should consider cost.  This debate will profit from a clear
picture of the feasibility principle.
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1 See Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition Justification, and Comment
on Conference Papers, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1153, 1157 (2000) (the need to compel a decision-
maker to confront costs justifies CBA); Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 261 (2001) (defending CBA by comparing it to the view that any
consideration of cost is wrong”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE
FUTURE OF THE REGULATORY STATE 14  (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT
STATE]; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998).   
2 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002)
(development of environmental regulation has almost always involved the consideration
of cost); Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159,
164 (1983) [hereinafter Strategies] (cost is “invariably” a criterion used to set technology-
based standards); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 456 (4th Cir. 1985) (Congress did not
permit EPA to ignore cost and EPA carefully analyzed compliance cost in developing
technology-based effluent limits).  Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY,
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (2002) [hereinafter, RISK AND REASON] (suggesting,
wrongly, that Congress did not consciously consider the reasons for technology-based
regulation and that Congress was “indifferent to” costs in the 1970s).
3 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1553; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 635 (2nd Cir. 1976) (reversing standards set without
considering cost of coping with freezing that might hinder application of relevant
technology); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding EPA’s
economic analysis while rejecting claim that it must conduct CBA); Industrial Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Secretary of labor could
(continued...)
DISTRIBUTING THE COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY
PROTECTION:
THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND
REGULATORY REFORM
David M. Driesen*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) often portray the choice
involved in deciding whether to create a “cost-benefit state” as simply a
choice between cost-sensitive decision-making and cost-blind decision-
making.1  But consideration of cost pervades the regulatory system and
always has, even before the current push toward CBA.2  In particular,
numerous statutory provisions establishing technology-based criteria for
setting standards require agencies to consider cost.3  But they do not require
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consider “economic feasibility” in promulgating standards under Occupational Safety and
Health Act).
4 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Protection:  Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 560-62 (1997) (explaining
that the term “benefit” in cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulation refers to averted
harm); Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 262 (5th Cir. 1989) (administrator must
determine whether costs can be reasonably borne by industry, but need not conduct a cost-
benefit analysis); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976) (section 306
of the Clean Water Act does not require cost-benefit analysis); American Petroleum Inst.
v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1988) (EPA need not correlate costs and benefits,
since economic and technological feasibility is the test for BAT limits under the Clean
Water Act); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 (1980) (BAT limits do
not require comparison of cost to effluent reduction benefits); Building and Const. Trades
Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Supreme Court has held
that Secretary of Labor may not balance costs against benefits in implementing feasibility
standards under Occupational Safety and Health Act).
5 124 S. Ct. 983, 999, 1002 n. 13 (2004) (discussing how best available control
technology (BACT) requirements in the Clean Air Act involve cost considerations but
restrain implementing agencies).  Environmental practitioners have taken to referring to the
case as the Cominco case, because it addressed a permitting issue at Cominco company’s
zinc mine.  Id. at 7-14. 
6 Cf. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 52-55 (2003) (suggesting that feasibility regulation
avoids serious economic disruption while declining to treat injury and death as fungible
like a dollar cost).
agencies to weigh those costs against the value of avoided harms (usually
referred to as benefits).4  Instead, they often require application of the
feasibility principle, a principle requiring maximum feasible emission
reductions.  The Supreme Court addressed this principle last term in Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA (Cominco).5  This
article examines that principle and compares it to CBA.
The feasibility principle reflects a key democratic decision about the
distribution of costs, namely a preference for avoiding widespread plant
shutdowns. This preference for avoiding plant closures provides a sensible
approach to distributional issues and addresses many other concerns that
influence CBA advocates.  Furthermore, by demanding stringent regulation
where such regulation does not threaten widespread shutdowns, this
approach maximizes the protection of health, which is fundamental to
welfare, in situations where doing so does not threaten welfare in a
significant way.6  This approach  allows Congress, rather than
administrative agencies, to make fundamental policy decisions about how
to evaluate the distribution of costs.  This Congressional role fits both
democratic theory and the claims of cost-benefit proponents better than a
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7 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 605-13 (arguing that administrative CBA is anti-
democratic).
8 See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387, 390-401 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (rejecting CBA as difficult if not impossible, but critically reviewing agency analysis
of technological capability).
9 See Christopher H. Schroeder, In The Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If
Feasibility Analysis is the Answer, What is the Question, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1496
(1990) (feasibility analysis seems to be gaining a “working hegemony in the world of
practical administration”). 
10 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the
toxic substances control act as requiring a cost-benefit approach to limiting toxic
substances); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(proponent of a pesticide must show that its benefits outweigh its risks).
11 See Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532); Exec.
Order No. 12, 291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34; Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638-49 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp.
1995); Exec. Order 13258, reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002).  See generally
Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1476-79 (1996) (discussing the executive orders and Unfunded
Mandates Act); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking:  An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (discussing OMB review under the Clinton
administration); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING:  OMB’S
ROLE IN REVIEW’S OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE
REVIEWS (2003).
12 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 34 (CBA’s strongest advocates are corporations,
trade associations, and associated think tanks); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New
Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
(continued...)
mandate that agencies consider CBA.7  Implementation of the feasibility
principle has an additional advantage; it requires a limited kind of analysis,
a feasibility analysis, that avoids many of the difficulties that plague CBA.8
The comparison between CBA and the feasibility principle matters
a great deal.  Technology-based standard setting provisions dominate the
United States Code.9  But they have existed, since the mid-1970s, alongside
a minority of statutes that have been based on a cost-benefit approach.10
Moreover, first by executive order, and more recently by statute, elected
officials have required CBA of most major regulations, including many
technology-based regulations.11   If the status quo continues, the debate
about the value of CBA will influence regulatory outcomes that now reflect
a requirement for CBA and different, albeit cost-sensitive, statutory criteria.
Moreover, industry, with significant support from the think tanks it
funds, some judges, and scholars who have adopted the conservative think
tank’s view of existing regulation, seeks to supplant existing law with cost-
benefit standards.12  Environmentalists and many academic environmental
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Analysis, 150 PENN. L. REV. 1489, 1498-99 (2002) (proposing to make a cost-benefit
criterion presumptively determinative of the stringency of regulation); Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222 (5th Cir. 1991) (creatively interpreting the Toxic
Substances Control Act as requiring cost-benefit analysis);  International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring) (encouraging
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to interpret the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSH law) as requiring cost-benefit analysis); American Dental
Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 1993) (Coffey J., dissenting) (suggesting that
OSHA should adjust its decision based upon a cost-benefit analysis). 
13 See, e.g., Linda E. Greer, Testimony of Linda Greer, PhD Senior Scientist, Natural
Resources Defense Council before the Senate Committee of Government Operations
concerning The Role of Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Reform
at 7 (February 15, 1995); Hearings on Pesticide Safety Improvement Act of 1991 Before
the Subcomm. on Dep't Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture, House Comm. on
Agriculture, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1992)(statement of Erik Olson, Senior Attorney,
Natural Resources Defense Council); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH SCIENCE
ADVISORS AS POLICY-MAKERS 207 (1990) (describing how scientific review of risk
assessment led to protracted delays under TSCA).  Donald Hornstein, Lessons from
Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law
Reform, 10 Yale J. Reg. 369, 422 (1993) (describing “analytical treadmill” stemming from
risk assessment as part of the CBA under the federal pesticide statute).
14 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 420, 462 (1987) (recognition of goals of resource distribution should temper use of
CBA); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1995) (suggesting analytical techniques for taking distribution into
account, but not discussing the normative theory of how and when distribution should
matter); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L. J. 165, 168 (1999) (suggesting  modification of costs and benefits to reflect the higher
marginal value of dollars to the poor).  Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not
So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729,
739-42 (making an equitable argument for technology-based regulation).  
law experts claim that such a change would greatly weaken environmental
law.13  Advocates for corporations and some academics argue that CBA
would improve government regulation.  All agree that the issue is critical.
  While past discussion of CBA usually focuses on the concept of
economic efficiency, leading scholars on both sides of the regulatory reform
debate agree that distribution of costs matters to environmental protection.
This article therefore moves beyond the debate about the merits of
economic efficiency to address the broader arguments made about CBA.
Those who have supported CBA while saying that distribution matters have
said very little about how current statutes or CBA  address distributional
concerns.14  A comparison of the feasibility principle and CBA allows one
to test the arguments of prominent CBA proponents, such as Cass Sunstein,
Matthew Adler, and Eric Posner, who support it, despite expressing
skepticism about neoclassical economic’s devotion to economic
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15 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 10 (identifying Sunstein as a proponent of a “softer”
variety of CBA than that offered by “free marketeers”).  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK AND
REASON, supra note 2;, Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324 (2001) (supporting CBA, but disapproving of willingness to pay
approach in estimating benefits); Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 187-94 (reviewing
arguments of defenders of CBA, most of which, come from economists); Eric A. Posner,
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2001)
(CBA may serve a valuable role, even if efficiency is not the proper social goal).
16 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961 (2001); Christopher T. Wonnell, Efficiency and Conservatism, 80 NEB. L. REV. 643
(2001); Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2002) (book
review); Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare:  Fairness, Utility, and the
Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 173 (2000); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare
Depends Upon Fairness:  A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002);
Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 12 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003) (book review);
Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 N. W. U. L. REV. 675 (2003); JULES
L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW (1988); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY
OF THE EARTH (1988).
17 Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Texas L.
Rev. 1243, 1297 (1987) [hereinafter, Regulatory Analysis](CBA is concerned with efficient
allocation of resources, not their distribution).
18 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 176-77 (noting confusion about what
CBA is and pointing out that some treat any method requiring tradeoffs, rather than
“absolute standards,” as CBA); Williams, supra note 1, at 261 (defending CBA by
comparing it to the view that any consideration of cost is wrong”).  
19 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001) (states
consider claims of economic and technological infeasibility when formulating state
implementation plans under the Clean Air Act); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938
F.2d 1310, 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (distinguishing between a cost sensitive feasibility
criterion and a cost-benefit criterion that involves weighing “pros and cons”).
efficiency.15  I focus on these scholars for a number of reasons.  First, they
include many of the most active, prominent, and influential writers on the
subject of government regulation and its reform.  Second, their arguments
have not received nearly as widespread critical attention as the efficiency
idea has in the academic literature.16 And finally, the question of why
scholars who claim to reject the principle economic rationale for CBA
nevertheless embrace the technique provides an interesting puzzle.17   
This article seeks to improve the quality of the ongoing regulatory
reform debate in three ways.  First, this article corrects a key error many
cost-benefit proponents make, equating consideration of cost with CBA.18
CBA involves comparing costs to benefits, but many statutory provisions
authorize consideration of costs without requiring agencies to weigh them
against benefits.19  This clarification shows that those who frame the debate
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20 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 1157.
21 See Schroeder, supra note 9, at 1496. 
22 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 175 (“when EPA did not use CBA it was
not clear what methodology it did use.”), 194 (suggesting that many economists favor
CBA, because they see no acceptable alternatives; while likening the alternatives to “no
guide at all”).
23 Opponents of CBA have relied more upon pragmatic arguments and less upon
defending alternative normative structures.   See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note
6; McGarity, supra note 1, at 23-32, 50-58 (discussing the pragmatic difficulties in
developing and applying CBA); FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER
AND THE LAW 90, 147 (1989) (feasibility regulation has proven the “most effective”);
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 17, 23 at 1254-55 (identifying techno-
bureaucratic rationality as a “second-best” rationality in light of practical limitations of
inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal goals, and political realities”);
Wendy A. Wagner, Innovations in Environmental Policies:  The Triumph of Technology-
Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 94-107 (arguing for technology-based statutes
as expeditious, enforceable, predictable, even-handed, and adaptable).  I do not mean to
disparage the importance of pragmatic arguments.  And even the pragmatists have included
some important theoretical arguments in their work.  See, e.g., Shapiro & McGarity, supra
note 14, at 735-36 (discussing contrast between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept methodologies for calculating costs); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
(1991) [ hereinafter REINVENTING RATIONALITY](combining a theoretical analysis with
pragmatic evaluation of experience); McGarity, Strategies, supra note 2, at 166-173
(discussing theoretical problems with economic efficiency).  See also SHAPIRO &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, at 49 (rejecting economic efficiency criterion as incompatible
with widely held social values).
24 Cass R. Sunstein, In Praise of Numbers:  A Reply, 90 GEO. L. J. 2379, 2384 (2002)
(suggesting that absent CBA regulators might have to “flip a coin” in order to make
(continued...)
as a debate between cost-obliviousness and CBA20 have distorted the
regulatory reform debate, and invites a more informed debate about the
consideration of cost in environmental law.  Second, this article takes a step
toward developing a positive theory of environmental law, explaining and
defending the normative values undergirding a vast array of statutory
provisions.21  We sorely need a positive theory of environmental law, lest
we radically revise it without adequately understanding its normative
structure.  In general, the lack of a positive theory has led many writers to
treat environmental law as hopelessly incoherent.22  That treatment makes
almost any reform proposal look attractive, at least to those not intimately
familiar with the practical pitfalls of CBA and the variability of the
approaches it spawns.23  Third, this article improves the regulatory reform
debate by comparing CBA to an alternative form of analysis, feasibility
analysis.  CBA proponents have distorted the regulatory reform debate by
suggesting that the alternative to CBA is no analysis at all.24  But even
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decisions). Cf.  Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation
of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1303
(1985) (a useful analysis of regulatory approaches must include an accurate description of
how the current system works). 
25 I focus upon the role of the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial here.
Cf. Richard J. Pierce, The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental Regulation, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1246-1257 (2002) (rejecting judicial canon of construction favoring
CBA).
without CBA agencies regularly engage in some form of analysis.  A
comparison between feasibility and cost-benefit analysis shines fresh light
on a number of the CBA proponents’ key arguments.    
This article reframes the regulatory reform debate as a discussion
about how to treat costs both institutionally and substantively.25  Because
current treatment of costs is so poorly understood, the substantive issues
have been inadequately defined in the past. 
This article begins by explaining the feasibility principle and its role
in technology-based regulation.  It then develops a theoretical argument in
support of this approach. 
The second part reviews the neoclassical economic theory that
supports CBA.  It then summarizes the recent legal scholarship repudiating
the neoclassical foundation, but offering a menage of alternative rationales
that purport to take the distribution of cost into account. 
The third part evaluates the question of whether the feasibility
principle meets the requirements of the theories advanced to support CBA.
It concludes that the feasibility principle  fits the requirements of CBA
proponents closely enough to make it impossible to understand why they
prefer CBA, at least in the context of most technology-based standard
setting.  It calls for a debate that focuses upon how to consider cost, at least
under statutory provisions that already require some cost consideration.   
II. THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE
This first part describes the feasibility principle’s content,
explains it role, and defends it normatively.  I claim that this principle
provides a useable heuristic, capturing a central thrust of technology-
based regulation.  It also provides a normatively attractive approach to
taking cost into consideration in a way that is sensitive to concerns about
the distribution of costs and environmental harms.
A.  Defining the Feasibility Principle
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26 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
27 Id. at 506.
28 See id. at 509.
29 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
30 Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509.
31 Id. at 508-09 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 831 (1976)).
32 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
33 Id. at 1-2 (the Act allows EPA to check state BACT determinations by blocking
construction of a facility).   
34 Id. at 23 n. 13.
35 Id.; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 508-509.
36 See id. at 509 (requiring “no” material health impairment, if possible).
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,26 the
Supreme Court addressed an industry claim that the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) must assure that the costs of
standards for toxic pollutants in the work place bear a reasonable
relationship to the benefits such a standard provides.27  The Court
rejected the argument.28  The statutory provision at issue in the case
required OSHA to “set the standard which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity.”29  The Court concluded that Congress had
already considered cost and decided to put the health and safety of
workers above all other consideration, save that of feasibility.30  The
Court, relying upon a dictionary definition, defined feasibility in terms of
what one is capable of doing.31   
Last term, the Court addressed feasibility again in Cominco.32 
The Court held that EPA may overrule state decisions about what
constitutes an emission limitation reflecting “best available control
technology” (BACT) under the Clean Air Act.33  The majority and the
dissent agreed that the BACT provision requires “the technology that can
best reduce pollution within practical constraints,” a formulation
suggestive of the maximum feasible reduction.34  The majority supported
its holding that EPA may correct state BACT determinations by pointing
out that the requirement to maximize emission reductions considering
cost constrained the state permitting authority’s discretion.35
The feasibility principle exemplified in these cases generally
requires stringent regulation,36 but presumptively subjects this demand
for stringency to two constraints.  First, the principle authorizes
government agencies to forego physically impossible environmental
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37 AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980-82 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing standard when
agency fails to show that techniques exist to meet the limit); Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 615 F.2d 794, 819 (9th Cir. 1980) (striking down
effluent limits, because EPA does not demonstrate that required biological treatment would
allow industry to meet discharge limits).
38 See, e.g., AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 982 (requiring agency to find that cost will not
threaten the existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does portend
disaster for some marginal firms); National Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, n. 7
(8th Cir. 1976) (EPA exempted small plants from regulations predicted to cause many of
them to close);Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Congress did not intend to protect employees from occupational health and
safety dangers by “putting their employers out of business”).  See Daniel A. Farber, Taking
Slippage Seriously, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 306 (1999) (explaining that Congress
enacted technology-based provisions for toxic water pollutants after EPA balked at
implementing risk-based standards that would lead to “widespread plant closings”).
39 See McGarity, supra note 2, Strategies, at 164 (standard setter must consider
economic and technological feasibility in setting technology-based standards); American
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1988) (BAT limitations must be
economically and technologically achievable).
40 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
41 Id. at 265 n. 14.
42 See American Federation of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3rd Cir. 1975)
(“the most certain way to eliminate industrial hazards is to eliminate industry”).
43 See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(Congress did not intend to cripple an industry or render it extinct); TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (calling the canon requiring construction not rendering any word
superfluous a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction).  Cf. Horsehead Development
(continued...)
improvements.37  Second, the principle authorizes government agencies
to forego constraints so costly that they cause widespread plant
shutdowns.38  I will refer to these constraints as the technological and
cost constraints respectively.39
These restraints might fail, in theory at least, to constrain
administrative agency unless understood in a properly limited way.  As
the Supreme Court pointed out in Union Electric v. EPA,40 a plant can
always meet an environmental standard by shutting down.41  Since
shutting down a facility reduces emissions to zero, an approach that
treated the shutdown of an industry as a feasible technological option
would provide no constraint at all.42  Since principles of statutory
interpretation preclude reading statutes to render any of their language
superfluous, such as the language requiring “feasible” measures, courts
have understood the feasibility principle as contemplating some
technological change that allows production of existing goods and
services to continue.43  It contemplates changes in how we produce
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43(...continued)
Corp. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (allowing regulation that imposes
potentially unfeasible requirements for monitoring products of incomplete combustion,
because standard is “protective of human health” and facility could cease to burn hazardous
waste as fuel).
44 See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(directing EPA to consider on remand whether its regulation “unduly precludes supply of
cement.”); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(technological feasibility satisfied if the demand for new passenger automobiles can
generally be met, even if emission standards limit model and engine choice).
45  See, e.g., Brennan, 530 F.2d at 121 (Congress did not choose to ban all hazardous
occupations);  Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Occupational Safety and Health Act does not put workers’ employers out of
business by requiring unavailable technology or destroying financial viability).
46 See Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 478.
47 See American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner J.)
(OSHA must determine whether standards imperil the existence of or threaten massive
dislocations to the industry); Brennan, 530 F.2d at 121-23 (Congress must have intended
to allow Secretary of Labor to consider technological and economic feasibility, lest the
Occupational Safety and Health Act require the elimination of hazardous occupations);
American Iron & Steel Inst., 577 F.2d at 835 (Congress did not intend to cripple an
industry or render it extinct). 
48 Professor Wagner’s claim that the theory behind technology-based standards is
“cost-blind” has some support in the legislative history of Best Available Technology limits
under the Clean Water Act.  Compare Wagner, supra note 23, at 93 with  Pac. Fisheries,
615 F.2d at 817 (explaining how legislative history led some courts to construe BAT as
cost-blind).  But the prevailing interpretation of this provision and all other technology-
based provisions authorizes consideration of cost.  See, e.g., Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 817
(EPA must consider cost in setting BAT limits).  She is correct that technology-based
standard setting criteria often do not “leave the door open to arguments” that implementing
the feasibility principle is unnecessary.  Id.  But that means that the standard usually
ignores relationships between costs and benefits, not that it ignores costs.  See, e.g., id. at
818-819.  If these standards ignored costs, they would allow shutdowns of entire industry,
which, I argue, they do not approve of.  
goods and services for consumers, not the elimination of the goods and
services.44  Indeed, the technological constraint implicitly defines
physically possible emission reductions as those achieved without
widespread shut down of plants.45  It does not refer to feasibility in the
abstract, but to the feasibility of existing businesses carrying out their
activities while meeting demands for pollution control.46  So understood,
the technological constraint limits permissible stringency.
The technological and cost constraints share the common goal of
avoiding widespread shut-downs of plants or facilities.47  In this sense,
they are both cost sensitive.48  
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49 Reynolds Metals Co. v. United States, 760 F.2d 549, 551 (4th Cir. 1985) (EPA tests
application of model technologies to figure out what discharge limits they can achieve);
Building and Const. Trade Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1268-69 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (finding a low asbestos exposure standard achievable even though some use of
respirators might be needed in some cases).
50 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 15.
51 See, e.g., Forging Industry Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1453-54 (4th
Cir. 1985) (reviewing agency cost estimates of specific measures required by standard
protecting workers from hearing loss).
52See EDWARD A PARSON, PROTECTION THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND STRATEGY
169 (2003) (an economics panel was unable to undertake any economic analysis of the cost
of replacing ozone depleting substances, because it worked in parallel with, rather than
after, a panel assessing technological options); Posner, supra note 15, at 1145 (cost of
regulation requiring installation of scrubbers will rely upon market data about the cost of
scrubbers to estimate benefits).
53 See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 297 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(describing this procedure); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420,
1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (record contains evidence of the cost of retrofitting offshore facilities
with reinjection capability). 
54 See National Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1976)
(remanding standards to EPA when it failed to consider increased cost estimate’s impact
on economic viability of new facilities).
55 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA (Cominco), 124 S. Ct. 983, 1006-08
(continued...)
The cost constraint requires assessment of cost and the
technological constraint requires assessment of engineering possibilities,
i.e. a technological assessment.49  But cost assessment presupposes
technological assessment.50  The cost of making any environmental
improvement equals the cost incurred in making the physical changes
necessary to accomplish it.51  Nobody can begin to estimate the cost of
an environmental improvement until an engineer describes the
technologies regulated parties will use to make that improvement.52  This
dependence of cost estimation on technological assessment applies to
any procedure that considers cost, including CBA.  Feasibility analysis
therefore begins with identification of technologies that might reduce
pollution.  It continues with identification of the levels of pollution
control these technologies might achieve. The analysis then estimates the
costs of employing relevant technologies to achieve various levels of
reduction.53    The cost constraint, however, implies that the regulator
must analyze whether the cost of implementing the technologically
possible reductions would lead to plant shutdowns.54  This implies that
regulators must compare cost, not to benefits, but to net earnings prior to
regulation and the value of corporate assets.55  Costs significant enough
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(2004) (state agency determination of infeasibility is arbitrary when it lacks information
about cost’s impact of profitability of an operation); National Wildlife Federation v. EPA,
286 F.3d 554, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2002); (plant closures predicted when net earnings fall below
the salvage value of a regulated mill); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th
Cir. 1976) (CBA not required for technology-based decisions under the Clean Water Act);
Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 456 (4th Cir. 1985); American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 836-37 (3rd Cir. 1978) (affirming the feasibility of a regulation
imposing total costs of around $240 million, because industry was profitable with
producers earning more than $857 million a year); National Renderers, 541 F.2d at 1289
(EPA erred in failing to compare costs to income to measure economic viability); United
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (no matter
how “initially frightening” the projected costs, a court must examine those costs in
“relation to the financial health and profitability of the industry. . .”).   
56 See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, 286 F.3d at 559 (EPA rejected regulatory
options that would cause mill closures); CPC Int’l.v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1051-52 & n.
42 (8th Cir. 1975) (low profit margins may make it hard to pass increased costs to
consumers, and therefore make costs of special concern).  Cf. Asbestos Information Ass’n
/North America v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 1984) (costs not exceeding 7.2 cents
per dollar of sale seen as reasonable).
57 Cominco, 124 S. Ct. at 1006-09.
58 Id. at 1007.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1007-08.
to render plants unprofitable could lead their owners to shut them
down.56  For that reason, feasibility analysis also includes an assessment
of the cost’s impact on shutdowns.
The Cominco Court recognized that consideration of cost in a
regulation subject to the feasibility principle requires comparison of the
costs of pollution control to the economic capabilities of facilities in a
portion of its opinion upholding EPA’s finding that the state permitting
authority established unreasonably lax BACT limits.57 Cominco, the
company whose permit limits were at issue, failed to disclose financial
data about its operation that might demonstrate  the infeasibility of the
limits EPA ultimately demanded.58  Because of this non-disclosure, the
state acknowledged that it could not determine whether the cost of
stringent controls would harm the “profitability and competitiveness” of
Cominco’s zinc mine.59  Since no basis existed for finding the mine’s
profitability and competitiveness impaired, the Court agreed that EPA
properly disapproved of the state permitting authority’s choice of
relatively lax pollution limits.60  The Court’s discussion of the agencies’
disagreement about BACT, however, implies that evidence that costly
 THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE 13
61 See generally id. at 1009 (EPA remains open to persuasion that its recommended
BACT limit would prove economically infeasible on an appropriate record).
62 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON,  supra note 2, at 217.
63 See, e.g.,  D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 820 (1977) (finding rejection of agency’s
technological analysis has been the ‘primary ground” for judicial rejection of effluent
limitations); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-401 (D.C. Cir.
1973); CPC Int’l, 515 F.2d at 1047-51 (rejecting technology not demonstrated to meet
promulgated standard within the regulated industry, while purporting to accept possibility
of basing standards on technologies used in other industries); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 634-37 (2nd Cir. 1976) (rejecting EPA rationale for standard
relying upon technology not costed and adequately discussed in the record); FMC Corp.
v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting reliance upon single plant’s
achievement and predicting that the regulated parties could apply their expertise to meet
limits, when record does not identify plant or provide details); Tanners’ Council of
America v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1193 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting regulation of tannery
effluent); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 981 (11th Cir. 1992) (agency concluded that
“existing engineering controls are available” to meet its standards for air contaminants, but
court rejects its finding because of lack of information about how specific industries will
meet the standards).
64 See, e.g., National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1151
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding limits on diesel engine exhaust emissions); National Wildlife
Federation, 286 F.3d at 576 (upholding regulation of pulp and paper effluent discharge);
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding air pollution
standards for new handheld non-road engines); Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 447 (upholding
limits on effluent from non-ferrous metal manufacturing industry).
65 See SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at 14.
controls would lead to a shutdown could justify a finding of
infeasibility.61 
Cass Sunstein has suggested that the feasibility principle’s cost
and technological constraints do not restrain regulators.  He writes that
“no agency has lost a challenge to the feasibility of its regulation,”
thereby suggesting that the courts do not hold agencies accountable.62   
As the cases set out in the margin demonstrate, courts have frequently
reversed and remanded agency determinations that its regulation is
feasible, usually on the ground that the agency has run afoul of the
technology constraint.63  Agencies may win many feasibility cases,64 but
they also lose a substantial number.
He also suggests that agency authority to force technology
provides an escape from the cost and technology constraints.  He writes
that feasibility limitations do not prevent basing regulations on
technologies that can be brought into existence with massive use of
existing resources.65  This argument grossly exaggerates the technology-
forcing character of regulation under the feasibility principle.  The courts
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66 Congress sometimes clearly indicates a technology-forcing intent through
employment of the future tense in articulating the feasibility principle.  See, e.g.,
Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 199-201 (statutory language requiring standards based on
technologies that “will be” available is technology forcing); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (future tense in statute read to
allow standards based on “projections of technology that is not currently available”);
Refiners Ass’n, 287 F.3d at 1136 (EPA may use technology-forcing standards for mobile
sources).  The courts, especially in the 1970s, often announced that the feasibility principle
not expressed in the future tense contemplates technology-forcing, usually because of
legislative history.  See, e.g., Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 391 (analogizing NSPS
provisions to technology forcing standards for mobile sources); Hooker, 537 F.2d at 636
(agency may rely upon technology which is not presently in use); Society of Plastics
Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 509 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (1975)
(OSHA may rely upon prediction that industry will develop new technology to reach the
required level of protection, but going on to identify existing technologies that can be
used); Asarco v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 746 F.2d 483, 495 (9th Cir.
1984) (interpreting Occupational Safety and Health Act standard setting provision as
technology forcing).  See also  Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 801 (D. C.
Cir. 1998) (stating that requirement for standards based on available technology could
allow standards based on “predicted improvements in existing technology”); Sierra Club
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (EPA may hold industry to “improved design
and operational advances”, because the “Clean Air Act” is a technology-forcing statute”)
Cf. Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (New Source
Performance Standards are not technology forcing); National Wildlife Federation v. EPA,
286 F.3d 554, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (agency evaluates existing or “available” technologies
to create BAT or BADT standards); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027,
1058 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Congress expected standards to be based on technologies
demonstrated on a pilot facility, but not to be limited to widely adopted technologies);
American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (accepting
agency reliance on two model Canadian plants as basis for a standard).
67 See La Pierre, supra note 63, at 805-831 (judicial requirement that agency prove that
at least one technology can meet the agency’s performance standard has prevented
technology-based regulation from forcing technological innovation).  La Pierre identifies
one case that would place the burden on industry to show that it could not achieve an
effluent standard.  Id. at 829 (citing American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023,
1038-39 (10th Cir. 1976)).  But EPA itself did not adopt this approach and the courts
agreed with EPA.    La Pierre concluded that the technology-based standard setting has not
provided an incentive for major technological innovation.  La Pierre, supra note 63, at 837.
 Even commentators who ascribe success to technology-forcing statutes recognize this
point.  For example, a student note appearing in 1979 claimed that the Clean Air Act has
succeeded in forcing the advance of technology in at least two key industries, electric
(continued...)
have often interpreted the feasibility principle as technology forcing (in
keeping with legislative history and, in some cases, clear statutory
language),66 but have adopted standards of judicial review that have
largely stymied adoption of regulations that rely upon significant
technological innovation.67  The courts have generally required agencies
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utilities and copper smelting.  See Note, Forcing Technology:  The Clean Air Act
Experience, 88 Yale L. J. 1713, 1718-19 (1979) .  The author, however, describes this
advance as a product of industry efforts to improve technology to meet state
implementation plan requirements aimed at meeting health based ambient standards.  Id.
at 1725 (state implementation plan (SIP) requirements stimulated almost all private
scrubber demonstrations prior to 1976).   Once the state level experimentation had
produced some results, EPA incorporated those results in its new source performance
standards.  Id. at 1727.  Thus, the feasibility-based limit simply facilitated diffusion of
existing technology.  But the Act as a whole produced some innovation by creating an
expectation that states must demand sufficient reductions to protect public health.  Id. at
1730-34.
68 See National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (placing
burden of proof regarding feasibility on EPA); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 642-43, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (purporting to place burden on car companies
to show that emission standards cannot be met, because they possess the data; but reversing
the burden once industry has made a prima facie case against feasibility); NRDC v. EPA,
655 F.2d 318, 333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (setting out a test for judicial review of agency
predictions of technological advances).  
69 See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 392, 395, 402 (explaining that a tested plant had
met EPA’s particulate standard and that EPA had relied upon actual test results not
predictions about future technology to justify its standard); Appalachian Power, 135 F.3d
at 801-806 (EPA showed that existing technology already performed to the standard, using
an extensive data-base of facilities already employing it); FMC Corp., 539 F.2d at 982
(EPA relied upon a plant’s performance to justify its technological choice); National
Asphalt Pavement Ass’n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (all parties agreed
that the technology EPA relied upon in creating New Source Performance Standards
existed and EPA claimed that actual tests demonstrated that it could meet the promulgated
performance standard); Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 360-64 (some plants had met this limit
over some period of time, but EPA relied upon some refinement of existing technologies
to predict compliance with its standard); National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, 287
F.3d at 1136-37 (test plants performed as well as or better than the standards required);
International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 625 (a car had actually met the standards, but industry
disputed whether the technology was sufficiently durable); AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 981
(agency concluded that “existing engineering controls are available” to meet its standards
for air contaminants); Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 263 (5th Cir. 1989)
(EPA defines demonstrated technology in terms of technology that works in “pilot plants,
semi-works, or other level”).
to prove the availability of technology under these provisions, in spite of
some early suggestions that industry, as the party with the most relevant
information, should bear the burden of disproving agency claims of
feasibility.68  Agencies have generally relied upon test results from
application of already existing technologies to justify regulations.69 
Courts sometimes invoke the Congressional intent to force technology in
order to allow agencies to rely on these test results in the face of
inevitable industry arguments that variations in real world conditions
render limited test results an unacceptable basis for regulation of an
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70 See Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 201 (while CAA section 213 is technology forcing, EPA
claimed that existing technologies already met the standard it imposed); . 
71  Husqvarna, 254 F.3d at 202 (EPA calculated cost of control under a technology-
forcing statutory provision); Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (EPA
must consider costs in implementing a technology forcing requirement for automobiles).
72 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983, 1002 n. 13 (2004)
(requirements for “best” and “maximum” emission reduction restrains the permitting
authorities’ discretion); National Grain and Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 728 (5th
Cir. 1989) (section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is “an affirmative
mandate” as well as a limitation); National Grain and Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 858 F.2d 1019,
1035-37 (5th Cir. 1988) (disapproving of agency rejection of union advocated controls that
promised some benefit); Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n, 870 F.2d at 263-64 (failure of EPA to
consider recycling that has enabled 36 operating facilities to achieve a zero discharge level
is arbitrary and capricious).
73 See Weyerhaueser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Clean 
Water Act best practicable technology criterion contemplates a right to a clean environment
limited only to the extent cleanup is impracticable or unachievable); National Renderers,
541 F.2d at 1289-90 (remanding standard when EPA did not appear to have maximized
emission reductions, while suggesting that EPA could justify lax standards if meeting
stricter standards would preclude construction of new facilities); Schroeder, supra note 9,
at 1486 (associating “feasibility analysis” with requirements to install the best available
technology that industry can afford); Building and Const. Trade Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Brock,
838 F.2d 1258, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Secretary must add measures protecting worker
health and safety so long as they are feasible up to the point where significant risk
disappears); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(overriding goal of provisions addressing reformulated gasoline is air quality, and other
factors are subordinate).  Cf. International Union, United Auto Workers v. OSHA, 37 F.3d
665, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (OSHA’s interpretation of law governing safety standards
incorporates feasibility principle’s constraints, but only partially incorporates its demand
for stringency); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 325, 331-332 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in
reviewing a new source performance standard guided, in part, by conferees’ agreement that
(continued...)
entire industry.70  But the agencies do not simply slip the technology
constraint through general appeals to the power of innovation. 
Furthermore, the cost constraint applies, even if a standard meets the
technology constraint on the basis of projected innovation.71  This
constraint would presumably prevent an agency from enacting a
regulation that relied on development of new technology that would
require expenditures significant enough to produce widespread plant
closures.  The cost and feasibility constraints provide real limits to
agency power to mandate pollution reduction.       The feasibility
principle does not, however, consist wholly of constraints, as the
Cominco decision clearly recognizes.72  This principle requires
maximum reductions at least up to the point where plant closures begin
to occur.73  This allows a great deal of environmental regulation to
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consideration of cost in regulating power plants would encompass a number of factors,
court declines to limit cost consideration to feasibility alone); Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d
374 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing an anti-backsliding rule to stand under a feasibility mandate
when agency had recently promulgated other rules influencing the relevant emissions, but
remanding failure to adequately consider a technology for “on-board diagnostics”).  
74 See Adam B . Jaffe, et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing:  What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 132, 141 (table
6) (1995) (showing direct compliance costs of less than .5 percent of shipment values in
many industries and less than 2 percent of shipment value in industries with high abatement
cost).   See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. Environmental Protection Agency, 615 F.2d
794, 818 (9th Cir. 1980) (annual cost of pollution abatement equals between one and two
percent of value of fishing industry sales); National Cottonseed Products Ass’n v. Brock,
825 F.2d 482, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (estimating compliance costs of less than .01% of
industry revenue); Richard W. Parker, Grading Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345,
1387-88 (2003) (OSHA’s proposed formaldehyde rule’s cost estimated at .1 % of
revenues). 
75 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 983 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing lack of
evidence that a stricter rule would not be feasible as reason to invalidate standard before
the court).  
76 See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (the OSH Act compels adoption of exposure limit that would “further
reduce a significant health risk” and is “feasible to implement”). 
77 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 289, 297-99 (1998).  See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554,
558 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (EPA promulgates discharge limits that correspond to the identified
technology, but does not require installation of that technology); Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d
at 803 n. 3 (fish processors may use alternatives to the EPA’s prescribed screening that
meet the published effluent limitations).
78 Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T:  The Convergent Evolution of
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continue without constraint.  This is because many significant
environmental improvements impose costs equaling a tiny fraction of the
value of industry sales.74  This approach does not permit an agency to
forego an environmental improvement with costs too insignificant to
produce closures.75  The agency cannot choose a laxer regulation from
several conceivable alternatives to save money when no plant closures
are involved.76
Neither the feasibility principle nor the family of technology-
based standard setting rubrics of which it is a large part requires
command and control regulation.  For technology-based standards rarely
command the use of a particular technology.77  Most technology-based
standard setting exercises produce performance standards, requiring
achievement of a particular level of pollution reduction.78 
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Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L. J. 403, 417-427, 450 (1994) (BATs) (explaining that in
pollution control law, companies can choose how to meet standards derived from
evaluation of technological alternatives). 
79 See Driesen, supra note 77, at 297-99 (explaining this point and document it
extensively); McGarity, supra note 2, at 164 (law rarely permits the standard setter to
mandate use of a particular technology).  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h); 7412(h); Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 316-17 n. 38 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
80 See Driesen, supra note 77, at 299.
81 See Schroeder, supra note 9, at 1486 (describing a technology-based approach as
one where the level of pollution control depends on analysis of technology). 
82 Cf. infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (explaining that the one technology-
based  statutory provision that seems to require CBA, does not).  The Safe Drinking Water
Act provides an example of a hybrid statute that combines technology-based standard
setting with authority to engage in cost-benefit balancing.  See Cass Sunstein, The
Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. J. 2255, 2267-2268 (2002); Thomas O. McGarity,
Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341, 2343-2344 (2002).
83 See Driesen, supra note 77, at 299.
84 See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 14, at 745 (pointing out that incentive based
tools can be used to stimulate installation of the best available technology).
85 McGarity, supra note 2, at 164 (a technology-based regime could rely upon a
pollution tax).  Professors Shapiro and McGarity point out that the first pollution tax
proposal in Congress aimed to stimulate installation of scrubbers.  Shapiro & McGarity,
(continued...)
Environmental statutes generally permit true command and control
regulations only when pollution cannot be measured to determine
compliance with a performance standard or emissions trading regime.79  
The term technology-based standard describes a type of criterion
Congress uses to guide agency standard setting.80  Agencies must assess
the cost and capability of technologies to set technology-based standards
and base their standard setting primarily on the capability of
technologies.81  This distinguishes technology-based standard setting
from standard setting where comparisons between the cost of technology
and benefits guides selection of standards.82  The feasibility principle
provides guidance to agencies deciding how much pollution reduction to
demand.83  
Agencies can employ this principle whether they choose to use
an emissions trading program, a performance standard (which requires
polluters to meet a numerical standard by a means of their choosing), a
pollution tax, or a true command and control regulation.84  For example,
an agency could set a pollution tax at a level that should encourage
maximum reductions, but not so high that it triggered widespread plant
closures.85  An agency adopting an emissions trading program could
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supra note 14, at 745 n. 88.
86 See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans,
Maryland Reasonably Available Control Technology Requirements for Major Sources of
Nitrogen Oxides, 64 Fed. Reg. 8034 (1999), to be codified at 40 C.F.R. part 52 (proposing
approving of emissions trading as a mechanism for meeting reasonably available control
technology limits).
87 Cf. Driesen, supra note 77 (questioning the dichotomy that tends to sharply divide
academics into proponents of either “economic incentives” or “command and control”
regulation).
88 See, e.g.,SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 10 (suggesting that the
debate about CBA is a debate between intuitive regulation and analysis).
89 See Farber, supra note 38, at 302 (describing the substitution of ad hoc permit
negotiations for uniform technology based standards under the Clean Water Act); Houck,
BATs, supra note 78, at 417-427, 445-47 (describing the plethora of standards and some
of the vagaries in their implementation); American Paper Institute v. Train, 543 F.2d 328,
339 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (EPA finds that costs justify benefits, because costs are a small
percentage of industry’s total capital investment); BP Exploration & Oil, Inc v. EPA, 66
F.3d 784, 795-96 (6th Cir. 1995) (EPA rejects technologically feasible option based on
high costs and negative non-water environmental impacts of reducing discharges to zero);
Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1980)
(permissible exposure limit for cotton dust considered infeasible for ginning industry,
because it would increase construction costs by 65% and increase costs by 50%); National
Cottonseed Products Ass’n v. Brock, 825 F.2d 482, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (costs likely to
threaten the competitive posture or structure of industry can render a standard infeasible);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 424 n. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(finding a case on the question of whether standards must reflect the capabilities of
technological leaders unhelpful, because legislative history varies with the particular
pollutant involved).
likewise employ a technology-based criterion to set the limits polluters
could meet through reductions at their own facility or through purchase
of credits, and some state agencies have done so.86  Adoption of the
feasibility principle for determining the stringency of regulation does not
imply any particular position in the debate between traditional regulation
and “economic incentives.”87
Technology-based standard setting appears incoherent to
advocates of CBA.88  This reflects, at least in part, the sheer number of
statutory provisions using this approach, the variability of language in
these provisions, and the vagaries of implementation.89  The foregoing
explanation helps explain the reasons for the feasibility principle.  The
feasibility principle offers, at a minimum, a proposal about how to
consider costs in environmental decision-making.  This proposal would
have heuristic value even if no environmental statute yet embodied this
principal.  
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90 By “capture,” I mean that it provides a reasonably good interpretation of these
provisions.  I do not claim that the agencies have adopted this interpretation or any other
interpretation consistently.
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
93 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
In fact, however, this proposal captures the central thrust of
existing technology-based statutes.  I do not claim that this heuristic
perfectly describes all environmental technology-setting provisions.  It
captures some provisions, such as the feasibility provisions in Donovan,
and perhaps in Cominco, quite well.90  But it captures others less well. 
We shall see that it characterizes enough of the law so that defense of
this heuristic should count as a substantial argument for a lot of
technology-based regulation.  And where technology-based regulation
deviates from the feasibility principal, one could usefully consider the
value of the deviation in deciding whether government policy-makers
should encourage these deviations, or reform environmental law to
conform better to this principal.
B.  Feasibility and Technology-Based Regulation
The feasibility principal has great influence in practice over
substantially all technology-based regulation.  But not all technology-
based statutory provisions conform to this heuristic.
1.  Statutory Provisions Explicitly Conforming to the Feasibility
Principle. – A large number of statutory provisions explicitly require the
maximum feasible reduction. While the precise content of the language
embodying this demand varies, these provisions basically conform to the
feasibility principle described above. For example, section 112(d) of the
Clean Air Act,91 which governs emission standards limiting hazardous
air pollution, requires the “maximum degree of reduction achievable,”
but directs EPA to consider cost in determining this maximum
achievable level.92  Clean Air Act provisions applicable to new sources
contain similar language.  Federally promulgated new source
performance standards must reflect the “best system of emission
reduction” that has been “adequately demonstrated” taking cost into
account.93  State limitations for new sources must require the “lowest
achievable emission rate” in areas that do not meet the NAAQS and the
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94 42 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a)(2); 7475(a)(4).  See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation
v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 893, 993 (2004) (discussing the “best available control technology”
requirements).
95 See, e.g., National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (emission standards for diesel engines must “reflect the great degree of
emission reduction achievable”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)); American Petroleum
Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Clean Air Act requires greatest
reduction achievable through reformulation of gasoline).  Cf. Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254
F.3d 195, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (section 213(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act requires “the
greatest degree of reductions achievable through” application of technology that “will be
available” to non-road engines).
96 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
97 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a); 1311(b)(2)(A).  The new source performance standard
provision closely resembles the provision governing new source performance standard
provision under the Clean Air Act.  See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Virtues of “Command and
Control” Regulation: Barring Exotic Species from Aquatic Ecosystems, 2000 U. ILLINOIS
L. REV. 1233, 1271 (referring to section 111 of the Clean Air Act, which governs new
source performance standards, as “analogous to” section 306 of the Clean Water Act).
Consistent with Clean Water Act’s zero discharge goal, the Clean Water Act new sources
provision requires standards eliminating pollution altogether, but only “where practicable.”
33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).  See also 16 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (requiring “the greatest degree of
pollution reduction achievable through. .. .best available pollution control practices” for
non-point dischargers in coastal zones).  
98 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
99 See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2).
100 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
101 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983, 994-95 (2004)
(continued...)
“best available control technology” in areas that do.94  And provisions
governing EPA standard setting for fuels and mobile sources contain
similar language.95
Many provisions in the Clean Water Act96 also contain similar
language indicating the presence of the feasibility principle.  For
example, new sources must meet discharge limits reflecting the “best
available demonstrated control technology” and existing sources must
eventually meet “best available technology” standards.97
The feasibility principle offers a coherent interpretation of these
provisions.  It is hard to understand what the “maximum reductions”98 
“lowest” emissions,99 or “best” technology100 available refer to, if not to
the feasibility principle.  The concept of achievability suggests that
reductions obtainable only through widespread shutdowns are not
achievable.  And the concept of maximizing achievable reductions
should mean that technically achievable reductions not having economic
impacts closing plants should be required under these provisions.101  I
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(describing EPA’s requirement that states implementing “best available control
technology” requirements under the Clean Air Act employ the most stringent technological
alternative, absent a demonstration that this alternative is unavailable for economic, energy,
or environmental reasons). 
102 See, e.g., National Lime v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing EPA’s
NSPS, because agency failed to show why its model plants were fairly representative of
the industry as a whole);  Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410,
420-24 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court and agency decline to mandate achievable reductions);
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 325, 331-332 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in reviewing a new
source performance standard guided, in part, by conferees’ agreement that consideration
of cost in regulating power plants would encompass a number of factors, court declines to
limit cost consideration to feasibility alone). 
103 See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 75 (1980) (BPT
limitations under the Clean Water Act do not require commitment of “maximum economic
resources to pollution control, even if affordable”).
104 Cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 137-38 (1977)
(standards requiring the “greatest” degree of effluent reduction achievable through
application of the “best” technology is intended to provide “maximum feasible control of
new sources.”) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, 58 (1971), Leg Hist. 1476).
105 See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1986).  The Clean Water Act
provision requiring the “best practicable control technology” considering cost arguably
accomplishes a similar relaxation by qualifying the superlative “best’ with the word
practicable.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b).  See, e.g., Texas Oil and Gas Ass’n
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998).
106 See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75 (unlike BAT standards, BPT standards do not
require maximum commitment of economic resources within the limit of affordability).
(continued...)
defend this as a heuristic, however, rather than as a perfectly accurate
description of practice, because the agencies and courts have not
consistently maximized achievable emission reductions under these
rubrics.102     
2.  Reasonably Available Technology. –  Some technology-based
statutory provisions appear to authorize less stringent regulation than the
feasibility principle requires.103  Congress signals this less demanding
approach to technology-based regulation by leaving superlative words
like “best,” “maximum,” or “lowest,” out of the statutory provision or by
qualifying the superlatives to diminish their force.104  A good example of
the absence of superlatives comes from the Clean Air Act, which
requires states to apply limits achievable through application of
“reasonably available control technology” to major stationary sources in
areas not meeting air quality standards.105  The provisions for best
“practicable” technology effluent limits offers a good example of
qualification usually leading to laxer standards.106  These appear to reject
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For a rare example of an agency paying less attention to economic restraints in the BPT
context than it typically does in BAT standard setting, see National Metal Finishers v.
EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n
v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (rejecting an economic achievability restraint).  I have
found no other case where an agency has taken such an aggressive approach to statutory
provisions that do not seem to insist on maximizing feasible environmental protection.  
107 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75.
108 See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 302-04 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(remanding regulation that failed to adequately consider whether the unprofitable steel
industry could raise sufficient capital to install pollution control equipment).
109 Agencies have often responded to this problem by analyzing the marginal cost
effectiveness of various reduction strategies.  Agencies have also sometimes employed this
approach to statutory provisions that seem to embody the feasibility principle.  See
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (EPA employed incremental
cost effectiveness analysis in setting standards for marine engines).  Generally, the dollars
per ton of marginal reduction increase as regulations become more stringent.  EPA often
reflexively chooses the mid-range of several control options it can envision and sometimes
chooses numbers to avoid a sharp upward slope of a marginal cost-effectiveness curve. 
Cf. Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204-07 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
avoidance of the knee in the curve is not required).
110 See NRDC v. Michigan, 805 F.2d 176, 180 (6th Cir. 1986) (since 1976, EPA has
interpreted the reasonably available control technology requirement to demand "the lowest
(continued...)
the demand that industry do everything possible, short of shutting down,
to maximize reductions.107 
  These provisions offer some guidance to agencies, but much less
guidance than the feasibility principle does with respect to minimum
stringency.  These provisions contemplate feasibility analysis. 
Assessment of whether a technology is “reasonably available” to an
industry requires some notion of whether it is very expensive for the
industry.  This in turn would seem to require some comparison of the
technology’s cost to the profits of industry.108  Like other technology-
based regulation, this form of it does not generally contemplate CBA. 
The  adverb “reasonably” modifies “available technology.”  But it gives
the agency little guidance as to when technically available technology
too cheap to cause shutdowns is “reasonably” available to it.109  Because
even these relatively lax standards aim to contribute to a statutory goal of
protecting public health and the environment, agency and judicial
interpretation makes these provisions stricter than their language might
suggest if considered in isolation from the statutes of which they are a
part.  EPA, for example, has consistently interpreted the reasonably
available control technology provision to require maximization of
reasonably available reductions.110  Still, these provisions remain far
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emission limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting by the application of
control technology that is reasonably available considering technological and economic
feasibility.")
111 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B).  See also La Pierre, supra note 63, at 819 (CBA
required for best practicable control technology standards but not for best available
technology standards).
112 Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).  Cf. Crushed
Stone, 449 U.S. at 76-77 (BPT limitations represent an EPA conclusion that the costs
imposed on industry are worth the benefits).
113 See Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 805; La Pierre, supra note 63, at 819-820 (describing
the one case to deviate from Pac Fisheries’ rejection of consideration of ecological
benefits, Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 9 ERC 1033 (4th Cir. 1976), as a “major
aberration”).
114 See Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 805.
115 The water quality consequences would prove unstable, because the value of a
pollution reduction would vary with the pollution levels of other sources.  These levels
would vary depending on business cycles and future regulations regulating different
pollution sources other than the sources under consideration.  
116 See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1976); E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1030 (4th Cir. 1976).  See, e.g.,
(continued...)
more ambiguous than statutory provisions that embody the feasibility
principle.  
The best practicable control technology requirements under the
Clean Water Act appear to deviate further from the feasibility principle
by importing CBA.  In assessing practicability, the statute requires EPA
to consider whether costs are wholly disproportionate to benefits.111   But
the courts, relying on the Conference Report on the bill that became the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, have construed the term
‘benefits” very narrowly.112   Rather then define benefit broadly in terms
of increased recreational opportunities, fishing, or freedom from
waterborne disease, they have narrowly defined it primarily as the
amount of effluent reduction.113  This interpretation reflects the
Congressional decision not to require the agency to demonstrate the
incremental effect of technology on the quality of receiving waters.114  It
is impossible to define benefits more broadly than just effluent reduction
without linking incremental reduction in an industry’s discharge to
specific water quality consequence, which  would vary in an unstable
manner on a site-by-site basis.115  Because this construction amounts to a
refusal to quantify the benefits to society from effluent reduction, this
statute does not involve cost-benefit analysis as conventionally
understood.116
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Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1290 (describing EPA cost effectiveness analysis determining that
cost of BPT limits equals less than $1 per pound of solids removed from effluent).  A
similar provision appears in the Clean Water Act provision governing best conventional
technology requirements.  See American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir.
1981); BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 1995) (EPA must
determine reasonableness of the relationship between costs and effluent reduction benefits).
The courts and EPA sometimes characterize this as a cost effectiveness, not a cost-benefit
test, in light of the limitations described above.  See American Paper, 660 F.2d at 961; BP,
66 F.3d at 798.  Cf. American Paper, 660 F.2d. at 961 n. 15 (referring to this as a cost-
benefit test).  In addition, these BPT provisions required a comparison between the costs
of reduction of industrial effluent and the cost of treating the pollution in publically owned
treatment works.  American Paper, 660 F.2d at 961.  In one case, the court upheld a BPT
regulation on the basis of CBA that might have been rejected under a feasibility standard.
See National Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 661-666 (3rd Cir. 1983),
reversed on other grounds, Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defenses Council,
470 U.S. 137 (1985) (deferring to agencies conclusion that costs were not wholly
disproportionate to benefits, because statute did not require a finding of practicability).  Cf.
Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1290-91 (in setting BAT limitations, EPA need not compare costs
to benefits).
117 See Cerro Copper Products Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 766 F.2d 1060, 1061 (7th Cir.
1985); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 75 n. 14 (1980) (describing
BPT limits as a first step toward elimination of discharges, with BAT limitations to follow).
118 See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing reasonably
available technology requirement applicable to existing sources); 42 U.S.C. § 7411
(requiring that any physical or operational change increasing emissions trigger application
of the “best” adequately demonstrated system of emission reduction, taking cost into
account); Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Transcript of Clean
Air Act Amendments Mark-Up, March 16, 1977 at 88-89, 91 (discussing expectation that
plants would be retired to avoid otherwise required costly new source controls). 
Generally these relatively lax provisions form the first stage of a
multi-stage program of increasingly strict regulation.  Thus, for example,
Congress generally required water pollution sources to meet best
practicable control technology standards by 1977 as a prelude to meeting
standards governed by the feasibility principle by 1984.117  Similarly, the
Clean Air Act requires  stationary sources to meet limits based on
reasonably available control technology, but also contemplates that
facilities will eventually shut down or meet requirements reflecting the
feasibility principle.118  This may make the vagueness and laxness of
these provisions more comprehensible.  Congress decided to take a step
forward with considerable latitude for agency judgment as a first step
toward conformity with the feasibility principle.
3. Some Conclusions About the Feasibility Principle’s Reach. –
All technology-based agency standard setting provisions conform to the
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119 See Mathew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1116-1124 (2000) (discussing
agency deviation from “textbook CBA”).
120 See, e.g., National Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 660 (3rd Cir.
1983), reversed on other grounds, Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defenses
Council, 470 U.S. 137 (1985) (estimating closures of 21.5% of one category of facilities,
3.1% of another, and 3% of a third).
121 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a),
7410(b)(1).
122 See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight:  One Strand of the
Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENVT'L L. REP.  (Envt'l L. Inst.) 10003, 10006-10008 (2001)
(describing the law governing listing of pollutants); John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused
Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (a detailed
treatment of listing decisions for toxic pollutants).  See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing agency examination of lead’s health effects prior to
regulation); Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
616-23 (1980) (plurality opinion) (discussing information found in OSHA’s analysis of
benzene’s health effects prior to regulation).
central thrust of the feasibility principle.  They seek avoidance of
widespread plant shutdowns.  The “reasonably available control
technology” provisions, however, allow agencies to back off from
requiring some very burdensome reductions that will not force
shutdowns.  The feasibility principle governs most technology-based
statutory provisions outright.  And its philosophy powerfully influences
the rest of the corpus of technology-based regulation.  
Those intimately familiar with the implementation of this
regulation will find the typology developed above a little too neat.  In
practice, implementation does not always follow the theory that animates
the statutes as closely as one might like.  Nevertheless, it is helpful to
clarify the theory behind several technology-based approaches.  And in
comparing the feasibility principle to cost-benefit regulation, one should
bear in mind that cost-benefit regulation in the past has not conformed to
its theory either.119  Technology-based regulation has often been less
stringent and occasionally more stringent than one might imagine form
the theory.120
C. The Feasibility Principle in Context.
The feasibility principle helps implement statutes aimed at
protecting human health and the environment.121  As a result,
government evaluation of risk to health and/or the environment generally
accompanies or precedes application of the principle.122
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123 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(g); United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728,
738 (3rd Cir. 1985) (reviewing agency claim that this provision justified failure to extend
hazardous material warning requirements beyond the manufacturing sector); AFL-CIO v.
OSHA, 965 F.2d 926, 984-85 (11th Cir. 1992) (reviewing agency claim that this provision
justifies limiting air contaminants rulemaking to substances requiring a more protective
limit than existing standards afford).
124 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 n. 29 (1981)
(identifying this provision as the appropriate locus for concerns about choosing among
health and safety priorities in a world of finite resources).
125 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
126 See Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 479 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (the Secretary of Labor must establish standards that insure no material impairment
of health); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2nd Cir. 1975) (the Secretary of Labor has a “duty
. . . to protect the workingman”).
127 Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 479 & n. 28 (accepting delay in lowering asbestos standard
only because record supports prediction that no harm is reasonably expected during the
transition period).
128 See, e.g., Auchter, 763 F.2d at 738-79 (the Secretary must extend hazardous
material warnings to all threatened workers unless doing so is not feasible in a relevant
industry); Building and Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1270-73
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (requiring OSHA to consider smoking control measures and a stricter
exposure limit in asbestos rulemaking). 
For example, the standards for toxic substances in the workplace
at issue in Donovan come about after a priority setting exercise under a
statutory provision directing OSHA to consider the “urgency of the need
for mandatory safety and health standards.”123  This provision tends to
focus the agency upon risks it thinks significant and allows it to set
priorities among those significant risks.124
The toxic standard setting provision appears in a statute that
seeks to “assure so far as possible every working” person a “safe and
healthful working environment.”125  As a result, the provision containing
the feasibility constraint includes an additional potential determinant of
the stringency of regulation, a health-based component.  This provision
requires OSHA to set standards (when feasible) to assure that no
employee suffer material impairment.126  This health-based component
requires evaluation of risk and constrains agency discretion, creating
both demands for and restraints upon stringency.127 
The demand for stringency comes from the prohibition on
permitting pollution that materially impairs health.  If feasible, the
agency must eliminate material health impairment.128   This demand
for stringency also implies a restraint upon stringency.  OSHA may not
regulate substances that do not impair health or do so only in trivial
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129 See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 973 (11th Cir. 1992).
130 See id. at 976-77 (reversing rule that failed to adequately explain why the particular
standard protects health); Brock, 838 F.2d at 1269-70 (reversing ban on spraying asbestos
products when no benefit would accrue).  See also Florida Peach Grow. Ass’n v. United
States Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 133 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing an emergency standard
when insufficient evidence supports finding of a grave danger from farmworker exposure
to pesticides).
131 See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(no scientific data demonstrates a safe level for exposure to carcinogens).  Cf. Chlorine
Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (a rare case in which
a cancer threshold has been established).
132 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality decision).
133  Id. at 652 (OSHA must show that “it is at least more likely than not that . . .
exposure to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health impairment”).
134 See United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 739 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(accepting decision to exclude chemicals posing “potential” but not “identifiable” hazards
from its list of substances triggering warning requirements without discussing significant
risk idea).
135 See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 652 (OSHA must show that “it is at least more likely than
not that . . . exposure to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health
impairment”).
136 See id. at 662 (agency must show significant risk “on the basis of substantial
evidence”).  See, e.g., Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 406-
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ways.129  It also implies that OSHA should not regulate pollutants
causing material impairment at levels more stringent than necessary to
assure the health and safety of each worker, even if more stringency is
feasible.130 
While this health-based restraint would prevent stringent
regulation to no purpose at all, it might provide little constraint of
regulation of substances that posed risks of serious health impairments. 
For example, many carcinogenic substances have no known safety
threshold.131  This concern may have motivated the Supreme Court
plurality decision in Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute132 (the Benzene decision), which requires OSHA to
findings of “significant risk” in order to regulate under this section.133  
Even absent findings of significant risk, however, the feasibility
principle would limit the stringency of standards.134  The requirement of
a formal finding of significance, however, forces the agency to defend a
particular level of regulation in court as involving significant risk, even
when no data exist about the level in question.135  Some courts have
interpreted the significant risk requirement as an anti-precautionary
principle.136  This requirement, however, does not require application of
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409 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to approve EPA regulation of cotton dust on basis of indirect
evidence of health hazard).  Cf. National Cottonseed Products Ass’n v. Brock, 825 F.2d
482, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to apply the significant risk standard to monitoring
requirements); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:  Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS 145 (2003) (arguing that some environmental
problems may conform to “power laws” that make catastrophic outcomes likely enough to
justify a precautionary approach).
137 American Textile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-512 (1981).
138 Id. at 506-09.
139 Id.
140 See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1992) (OSHA must
determine which health impairments are material and which risks are significant).
141 Cf. Forging Industry Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, 748 F.2d 210, 214-15 (4th Cir.
1984) (vacating standard for noise based, in the majority’s view, on non-work-related
hazards). 
142 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
143 See National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431-32 n. 48 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussing the criteria document for particulate issued in 1971).
144 See American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 531 U.S. 457, 465-71 (2001); Natural
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CBA, as Donovan makes clear.137  Once the agency finds a risk
significant, it must stringently prevent it, subject to the feasibility
constraint.138  It need not compare the degree of significance to the
amount of cost.139  This does not involve some sort of free form
balancing; but a requirement to protect health subject to a feasibility
constraint.  With or without significant risk findings, the statute would
prevent regulation of clearly trivial risks and avoid widespread plant
closures in regulating non-trivial risks.140   
In the environmental context (as distinguished from the
occupational),141 technology-based standards usually follow, rather than
coincide with, determinations about the nature of threats from pollution. 
Technology-based standards often become the principle means of
limiting the pollution of particular types of facilities in order to achieve
goals for the ambient environment.  
The Clean Air Act142 provides an example of technology-based
standards following assessment of health and environmental risks.  The
Act requires EPA to create a “criteria” document summarizing the
relevant science.143  EPA relies upon this compendium of scientific
information to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
“criteria” pollutants (named after the “criteria” document collecting the
scientific information) protecting public health the environment.144 
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Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Lead Indus. Ass’n
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980); American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
145 See, e.g. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN
URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION (1991) (National academy of science review of the
literature on ozone).  In addition to ozone, EPA has established NAAQS for sulfur dioxide,
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxide.  See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.
146 See Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 724, 230 (6th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing between plant
emissions and measurement of ambient air around the plant).
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3); Arnold Reitze, Mobile Source Air Pollution Control,
6 ENV. LAW. 309 (2000).
148 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7412; 7511; 7521. 
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
151 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATISE § 3.98 at 231
(1994).
Scientists generally agree that ample evidence supports EPA’s view that
the handful of ubiquitous pollutants regulated under this provision have
serious health and environmental effects.145  
As the term “ambient” suggests, these NAAQS standards govern
the concentration of pollutants in the air surrounding us.146  Those
pollutants, however, come from sources of pollution, such as factories,
“stationary” sources in the jargon of the Act, and “mobile sources,” such
as cars.147  The Clean Air Act requires states to develop emission
standards regulating at least the stationary sources to meet the federal
ambient standard (the NAAQS), with aid from some federal emission
standards, especially for mobile sources.148  
The Act relies heavily upon technology-based emission standards
as the principle means of meeting the ambient standards.  One might
think of the technology-based regulation as the first cut at meeting the
NAAQS, since states have an obligation to make more cuts than the
particular technology-based provisions require, if needed to meet the
NAAQS.149
The toxics provisions of the CAA follow a similar model of
separating listing of pollutants from technology-based standard setting
and using technology-based standards as the first cut at moving toward
the goal of protecting public health.  Congress listed 189 hazardous air
pollutants for regulation in the 1990 Amendments.150  These pollutants
are typically associated with risks of extremely serious problems, such as
cancer, neurological damage, and birth defects.151  This Congressional
listing followed two decades of agency lethargy, during which EPA
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152 See Thomas O. McGarity, Executive Oversight at EPA, 1991 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 192.  
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d),(e),(f)(2).
154 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
155 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
156 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
157 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2).
158 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313. 
159 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (referring to standards for intrastate and interstate waters).
160 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (outlawing discharge of radiological, chemical, or
biological warfare agents, high-level radioactive waste, or any medical waste).  
161 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314.
162 Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.  I
have referred to this statute as subsequently amended by its more common colloquial name,
the Clean Water Act, above.  But for purposes of discussing the 1972 amendments, I prefer
to use the formal name of those particular amendments.
163 See Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 97 n. 1, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
listed only 7 hazardous air pollutants for regulation.152  Congress
required EPA to complete a round of technology-based rulemaking for
all major sources of the listed pollutants and to follow up with health-
based regulations eliminating residual risk.153 
The Clean Water Act154 (CWA) has an even more demanding
goal of eliminating discharges into the “waters of the United States.”155 
It sets a more modest interim goal of protecting fish, wildlife, and
recreation in and on the water.156  The CWA authorizes EPA to list
pollutants regulated by the Act, directing the agency to figure out which
sorts of pollution interfere with water quality necessary to provide for
recreation, habitat, and other values associated with good water
quality.157  It also requires states to set water quality standards, subject to
EPA review.158  These water quality standards are analogous to ambient
air quality standards in the Clean Air Act in focusing upon pollution in
the environment, rather than the amount of pollution any particular
facility releases.159  While the CWA bars some especially dangerous
pollutants outright,160 it relies upon technology-based standard setting for
major sources of water pollution as the principal means of meeting the
CWA’s goals for most pollutants and of meeting water quality
standards.161 The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act162
established the technology-based program for conventional pollutants
and a health-based program for toxic pollutants.163  But EPA abandoned
the health-based program in favor of a technology-based program for
toxic pollutants as well, and Congress subsequently ratified its
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165 See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States-State Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972:  Part II, 22 STAN. ENVT’L L. J. 215,
266 (2003) (explaining that experience in the impossibility of translating water quality
standards into precise limits on effluent discharges motivated the switch to a technology-
based approach under the 1972 FWPCA); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 790
F.2d 289, 293-94 (3rd Cir. 1986) (describing how the 1977 Amendments codified a consent
decree by applying best available technology standards to pollutants regulated under the
decree); Latin, supra note 24, at 1307-09 (describing the substitution of best available
technology for an ample margin of safety standard to cure a paralyzed risk based program).
Latin points out that a cost-benefit approach would be even more difficult than the failed
approach the technology-based program replaced.  Id. at 1309. 
Under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA has sought to
apply a technology-based approach under a statutory provision directing it to “minimize”
health and environmental risk.  See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d
355, 362, 365 (D. C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the statute does not preclude this approach).
Subsequent regulations, however, rely, to some extent, upon risk-based elements.  See
Horsehead Resource Development Corp., 16 F.3d 1246, 1266 (D.C. Cir 1994) (allowing
escape from monitoring requirement if polluter can demonstrate the safety of products of
incomplete combustion); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 11-12
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing dilution in lieu of treatment). 
166 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312.  For an authoritative and thorough look at
the problem of state calibration of limits to meet water quality standards see Oliver Houck,
The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V, Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Envt’l L. Inst.) 10,385 (2002); Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV:  The Final Frontier,29 ENVT’L
L. REP. ((Envt’l L. Inst.) 10,469 (1999); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework
for the Clean Water Act's Ambient Standards Program, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.)
10,415 (1998); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward
Water Quality-Based Regulation under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envt’l L.
Inst.) 10,391 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs:  The Resurrection of Water Quality
Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envt’l L.
Inst.) 10,329 (1997).
decision.164  This reliance upon technology-based rulemaking came
about, in part, because of the failure to promulgate standards under a
provision requiring regulators to link specific discharges to specific
conclusions about health and environmental effects.165  Furthermore,
these technology-based standards offer a first cut at meeting water
quality goals, with states, and to a lesser extent, the federal government,
having a residual responsibility to regulate pollution sources to meet
water quality goals not attained through the federal technology-based
program.166
The environmental statutes’ reliance upon technology-based
emissions standards to meet goals for ambient level environmental
quality has several implications for consideration of risk.  First,
consideration of risk precedes setting of standards that actually mandate
that pollution sources reduce their output of pollutants, often by many
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167 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7511a.
168 See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 151, § 4.1, p. 254 (1994) (discussing thousands of
industrial sources of water pollution); Patricia Ross McCubbin, Amending the Clean Air
Act to Establish the Democratic Legitimacy for the Residual Risk Program, 22 VA. ENVT’L
L. J. 1, 2, 40 n. 169 (2003) (referring to tens of thousands of industrial sources of air
pollution and the need to address the cumulative risks they create).
169 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 593 (explaining the reasoning behind this).  See
also THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK
MANAGEMENT, FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT 9-14
(1997) (recommending more consideration of aggregate risk). 
170 See Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. Environmental Protection Agency, 615 F.2d 794, 805
(9th Cir. 1980) (Congress authorized technology-based standards to free agency from
necessity of linking particular discharges to water quality benefits, because of the failure
of past efforts to enforce water quality standards); Latin, supra note 24, at 1282 (science
has been unable to link particular sulfur dioxide discharges with particular manifestations
of harm); William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVT’L L.
& POL’Y FORUM 247, 272-73 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of linking permit violations
to particular harms stemming from overall ambient conditions).
171 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7509(d) (requiring review of national ambient air quality
standards every five years); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (requiring hearings every three years
to determine whether water quality standards need revision).  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1)
(setting out a schedule effectively requiring continuous rulemaking activity establishing
technology-based emission standards over a ten year period). 
172 See McGarity, Strategies, supra note 2, at 165 (a balancing of costs and benefits
would require consideration of media-quality).
years.167  Second, agencies consider the harms that actually matters to
people, the harms that overall levels of pollution in the environment
create.  People are exposed to the pollutants in the ambient air and in the
water they use.  These levels typically reflect small marginal
contributions from thousands of pollution sources that cumulatively can
create serious problems.168  Overall risk is always much higher than the
risk posed by the marginal reductions proposed for a single group of
pollution sources.169  Indeed, large risks can appear to disappear
altogether if disaggregated into units small enough to raise modeling
problems.170  Third, agency consideration of risk typically occurs
occasionally, but not many times a year, as it probably would if the law
required government agencies to assess the marginal risk avoided from
each group of sources it regulated.171  Fourth, consideration of risk in
conjunction with emission standards would require evaluation of the
combined effects of the target polluters’ emissions or effluent with the
chemicals in the surrounding environment.172     This divorce of risk
assessment from technology-based standard setting makes it possible to
set standards for large groups of sources at once.  Technology-based
standard setting provisions usually anticipate agency promulgation of
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173 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (requiring a schedule for categories of pollution
sources). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (requiring case-by-case controls for new
and modified sources).
174 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1977) (claiming that
individual consideration for each discharger would be impracticable).
175 See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(discussing the difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying the benefit to ambient
conditions from New Source Performance Standards).
176 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(relating the cost of control to the associated benefits at the time of promulgating a new
source performance standard is a “practical impossibility”).
177 See La Pierre, supra note 63, at 777-78 (since states have different levels of ambient
air quality and different mixtures of sources, meeting health based standards requires
different mixes of control in different regions).
178 See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. Environmental Protection Agency, 615 F.2d
794, 806 n. 7, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing how the effects of dumping fish entrails
would vary with location of discharge and currents in the receiving water); National
Asphalt Pavement Ass’n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (a firm definition of
significant contributions to an ambient air problem would be “meaningless,” because the
significance would vary with topography, distribution of pollution sources, stack height,
and meteorology).
179 Defeat of a wholesale approach has been a major industry objective for thirty years.
See La Pierre, supra note 63, at 812-13 (in over 250 suits [prior to 1977], industry has
challenged EPA’s authority to set national uniform effluent limits under the Clean Water
Act).  This probably reflects the reasonable hope that defeating national limits would lead
to case-by-case decisions that would delay or defeat regulation altogether.  See McGarity,
Strategies, supra note 2, at 164 n. 20 (case-by-case standard setting implies “enormous”
administrative costs);  Cerro Copper Products Co., v. Ruckelshaus, 766 F.2d 1060, 1067-68
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standards for entire categories of industry in a single rulemaking.173  This
allows for much more effective regulation than case-by-case standard
setting for thousands of pollution sources would permit.174 
Consideration of benefits would defeat this wholesale approach, at least
as applied to efforts to address ambient pollution levels through national
emission and discharge limits.175   If it were possible to measure the
marginal benefit of a particular quantity of reduction from a discrete set
of sources at all, it could not be done on a wholesale basis.176  A uniform
quantity of reductions would not produce uniform benefits.177  Rather,
the amount of benefit from a given airshed or watershed would depend
on the particular characteristics of the receiving air and water, which
vary regionally.178  Hence, any standard setting establishing discharge or
emission limits would have to proceed on a plant-by-plant inquiry,
thereby eliminating the enormous economies of scale and transaction
cost reduction associated with wholesale standards.179
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(7th Cir. 1985) (declining to allow a polluter to escape pretreatment standards in advance
of the municipal plant’s compliance with discharge requirements, because of Congressional
desire for economies of scale through national pre-treatment standards).  Cf. Cerro, 766
F.2d at 1069 (noting that EPA does allow variances in pre-treatment standard based on the
capabilities of municipal treatment facilities).
180 This would also be true of efforts to regulate non-point source pollution and other
smaller sources that increasingly deserve regulatory attention.  While it is not clear that a
traditional regulatory approach will work for these sources, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM AND
DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS:  NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION (2002) (thoughtfully discussing approaches to regulating smaller sources),
any approach that relies on CBA will face the problem of modeling benefits that depend
even more completely than industrial source pollution did, upon interactions with the
surrounding environment.  Indeed, this approach would be even worse for “third
generation” problems, since non-point and other smaller pollution sources are so numerous.
181 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 74-76 (discussing the need
to take equity into account).
182 See Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
(continued...)
 If Congress required assessment of the risks associated with
various marginal reductions (as in CBA), then the agency would
confront the paralyzing challenge of modeling interactions of pollutants
in numerous regions or sites.180  In general, divorce of risk assessment
from consideration of cost is crucial to national standard for industries
that contribute to ambient pollution on the basis of interaction with other
pollutants. 
D. Normative Defense of The Feasibility Principle.
If one believes, as many CBA proponents do, that
environmental regulators should consider the distribution of costs and
benefits of environmental regulation, the feasibility principle  has much
to recommend it.181  This approach focuses regulators’ attention on
significant costs and avoids wasting resources considering finely
calibrated responses to costs having minor impacts on society. 
This approach relies primarily upon information about the
distribution of costs to separate significant from insignificant costs. 
When economic losses become concentrated in ways that devastate
individuals, they can have drastic effects, even if the total amount of cost
is low.  Conversely, widely distributed costs can have minor effects,
even if total aggregate costs are high.  This “concentration” principle
suggests that the distribution of costs can tell us a lot about their
significance.182
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L. 119, 135-36 (2003) (asking why we should allow deaths so that other might build “multi-
million dollar mansions”); Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Why Relative Economic
Position Does not Matter, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 23 (2003) (statistical tools do not
adequately capture distributional consequences).
183 See EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 171 (1999) (environmental regulation supports blue-collar jobs).
Contra SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 136 (asserting that private
expenditures on regulation decrease employment).  Sunstein fails to cite any authority to
support that view, even though economists have studied the impact of environmental
regulation on employment extensively.  See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, William A.
Pizer, and Jhih-Shyang Shih, Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry Level Perspective,
43 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MANAGEMENT 412 (2002).
184 See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 669 (2002) (environmental regulation is big business
employing people who make and install pollution control technology).
185 See generally Driesen, supra note 4, at 575 n. 132 (explaining that inefficient
allocation does not coincide with lower employment, but that the question of whether a
particular pollution control expenditure generates more employment than a foregone
opportunity would requires empirical investigation).
186 See Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and
Their Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 315 (1986) (explaining how energy
conservation jobs can employ more people than the substitute expenditure of constructing
power plants).
Reliance upon the feasibility principle tends to produce high
employment.  As a general rule, environmental regulations not closing
plants may increase employment.183  Regulations often force companies
to hire more workers or pay contractors to install and operate pollution
controls or to redesign processes to prevent pollution.184  Indeed, more
stringent and costly regulation may force more pollution-control related
hiring than less stringent and costly regulation, as long as the regulation
does not make plants unprofitable and lead to shutdowns.185
Increased expenditures (short of those causing shutdowns) may
maximize net employment, even after considering the possible negative
impacts of taking resources away from something else to pay for
pollution control.186  Pollution control hiring may redistribute money
from managers, stockholders, or customers to employees.  If employees
earn less than managers and stockholders and losses to customers are
widely distributed, this redistribution may significantly improve the lives
of unemployed people who gain the new pollution-related jobs without
significant harm to others.
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187 See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 4, at 741 (individual impact of costs on
consumers and stockholders is likely to be insignificant as compared to hardship imposed
upon workers and families by occupational hazards). 
188 See, e.g., American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 139-40 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (predicting “no significant impact” upon frozen food industry, because the industry
would probably raise prices to pass on costs of effluent controls); Lignite Energy Council
v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (New Source Performance Standards for utility
and industrial boilers will only modestly increase electricity prices); American Textile
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Donovan, 452 US. 490, 532 (1981) (OSHA predicted that price rises would
cover the costs of a standard much more stringent than the one it promulgated).
189 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at (suggesting that a claim that
those who bear the costs of regulation can do so easily might justify a departure from the
principle that benefits should justify costs).
190 See, e.g., Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (regulating
almost 200 pulp and paper mills); Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 718 F.2d 55, 58 (3rd Cir. 1983)
(regulating 4700 integrated plants).
191 See GOODSTEIN, supra note 183, at 44 (explaining that “markets adjust” to
regulation by “uncovering substitute methods of production and . . . cheaper clean-up
technologies”).
192 See Nicholas A. Ashford, Compliance Costs: The Neglected Issue of Technological
Innovation, EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK MAGAZINE 30-33
(1999); David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation, 33 ENVT’L L.
REP. 10094, 10103-04 (2003) (providing detailed examples of innovative responses to
stringent regulation).
Often costs imposed on companies become distributed so widely
that they have little real impact on human lives.187  Profitable industries
can absorb some costs without any major impact on consumers or
workers.188  Costs distributed widely might properly be characterized as
de minimus even when they seem quite large.189  One hundred million
dollars a year, for example, may seem like a lot of money to an
individual.  But that cost distributed among one hundred million people
equals just a dollar a year.  A regulation costing one hundred million
dollars a year may distribute that cost among hundreds or thousands of
regulated firms.190  And each of these firms may spread these costs over
its entire customer base through modest price increases.  One hundred
million dollars sounds like a high number, because most of us think in
terms of individual incomes and not industry cash flows.  But such a
small amount of money may have impacts so trivial as to merit little
consideration.
Furthermore, firms can creatively compensate for or avoid
costs.191  Indeed, when environmental regulation has been demanding,
firms have often engaged in innovative changes to avoid the cost of
regulation.192  This conforms to the induced innovation hypothesis that
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induced innovation in energy efficiency and describing the hypothesis); Timothy F. Malloy,
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194 See PARSON, supra note 52, at 19-22 (discussing uses of CFCs).
195 See Driesen, supra note 192, at 10103; OZONE DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES:
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS (Elizabeth Cook, ed. 1996); PARSON, supra note 52, at 4
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associated cost).
196 See Driesen, supra note 192, at 10106 (discussing tweaking and innovation).
197 See Schroeder, supra note 9, at 1504 (linking the feasibility principle to avoidance
of “substantial social dislocation.”).
198 Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1493 n. 16 (pointing out that costly regulation
may increase employment in the long run, by making capital more expensive than labor).
economists use to model innovation, which posits that firms will tend to
innovate to avoid using scarce and expensive production factors.193  For
years, many industries considered ozone depleting substances essential
to their businesses and paid large amounts of money to obtain them.194 
Many of these companies switched to soap and water, saving lots of
money, when phaseouts began to raise the price and threaten the future
availability of these chemicals.195  High costs for polluting industries can
sometimes improve the business prospects of cleaner competitors, rather
than lead to any net losses at all.  And emissions trading, even if it does
not encourage major innovation as many have argued, makes possible a
lot of tweaking to avoid costs.196  Cost avoidance behavior further
reduces the impact of costs upon people’s lives.    
By contrast, regulations that force a plant owner to shutdown
decrease employment, at least in the short run.  This can concentrate
severe economic losses on small numbers of workers who can ill afford
them.197  This sort of loss can have a devastating impact on workers’
lives, leading to depression, a terrible feeling of loss, and an inability to
cope economically, especially if unemployment or very severe
underemployment proves permanent.  
Regulations shutting down plants may not decrease net
employment.  If demand remains constant, employment may shift to less
polluting enterprises producing equivalent goods or services.198 
Nevertheless, such regulations can impose significant hardships upon the
individual workers who lose their jobs.  Environmental regulations,
which have historically included a combination of health-based
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HAZARD ASSESSMENT STAFF REPORT:  PUBLIC HEARINGS TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS TO
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http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/aaqs/std-rs/pm-final/pm-final.htm (2002) (air pollution
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202 See generally Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1568 (people expect
government to protect them from risks they cannot avoid, rather than their own choices to
engage in risky behavior).
203 COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1987); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L. J. 1383 (1994); Brian D. Israel,
An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. J. 469; Eileen
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standards and technology-based regulation, has produced a small net
increase in employment.199  The feasibility principle may help account
for this positive record.  
While firms often can systematically distribute regulatory costs
widely or avoid them altogether, harms from pollution often devastate
randomly selected individuals.200  Cancer, for example, can lead to a long
slow painful death for some unfortunates.  Birth defects can ruin the
lives of children born with them and afflict their parents with enormous
burdens.  Asthma can  make its victims gasp for air, send asthmatics to
hospital emergency rooms in summer, and force children from the
playground on hot days.201  As these examples demonstrate, we should
think of most pollution control programs as efforts to ameliorate
concentrated harms.
Furthermore, while imposition of regulatory costs tends to spawn
cost avoidance behavior, some of which can be very socially productive,
pollution can impose burdens that one cannot easily escape.202  Since
people must breathe, they cannot escape air pollution.  Of course,
relatively wealthy individuals can choose among the cleanest areas and
escape some of the worst effects of pollution.  But others have fewer
options.    
Many pollution sources concentrate their impacts upon particular
regions or communities, often communities of color.203  Concentrations
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204 See Wagner, supra note 23, at 94-96 (technology-based standards promulgated at
three to ten times the rate of the alternatives).  
205 See Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (describing
how concerns about special interest using economic variance provisions as tools for
unjustified avoidance of pollution reduction led to limits on their use and reliance on small
business loans to ease compliance difficulties).
206 See generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (2003).
207 ID. at 9-10,137-38.
208 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVT’L LAWYER
309 (2000).
209 See DRIESEN, supra note 206, at 128.
210 See Id.  
of facilities can exacerbate pollution’s tendency to single out individuals
for devastating consequences by making those consequences much more
likely in communities of color (which may also experience
disproportionate poverty).
At the same time, the feasibility principle limits the discretion of
agencies to forego environmental improvements that do not concentrate
costs in ways that lead to plant shutdowns, which may involve massive
job losses.  It should make some decisions relatively easy.204  This
relative ease matters a lot, because major environmental problems
typically stem from many sources of individually minor pollution that add
up to a significant problem.  Most environmental statutes regulate large
numbers of facilities in a wide variety of industries for this reason.  If
every regulation led to a protracted general debate, standard-setting
would grind to a halt and pollution would increase markedly.205
This relative ease also helps regulators keep up with the economic
dynamics of pollution increases.206  Pollution tends to increase with rising
consumption and population, so that a regulatory system always has to
run just to keep in place.207  The clearest example of this involves
automobile pollution.208  In spite of requirements to drastically reduce the
tail-pipe emissions of cars, car emissions have only modestly declined.209 
Increased driving has wiped out much of the improvement.210  This is not
an indictment of technology-based regulation.  It does show, however,
that pollution control regulators have a lot of work to do just to stay in
place, especially since regulators are reluctant to regulate consumer
behavior (such as driving habits).  For the most part, government does not
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account the adversarial nature of environmental decision-making); Thomas O. McGarity,
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L. REV. 1243 (1999) (arguing against judicial review of agency regulations, partly because
(continued...)
regulate consumption or population increases, so the regulatory system
must make up for pollution increases due to those factors just to avoid
slipping backwards.211  This dynamic further supports the need to avoid
making each regulation into an occasion for protracted analysis and
litigation.212  
Ease of regulation also matters because of the extraordinary
ability of special interests to resist regulation.213  Any company
converting natural resources to products for human consumption can
extract profits from the entire society to finance resistance to
environmental regulation.214  The regulated company can then hire a
battalion of lawyers and other experts to fend off regulation.215  This has
predictable consequences.  Regulated firms provide the overwhelming
majority of significant written comments in rulemaking, meet with
regulators incessantly, ask the elected beneficiaries of their campaign
contributions to hound EPA when it seeks to regulate them, litigate often,
and frequently resist enforcement.216  Environmental regulation always
takes place on an uneven playing field, in spite of strong efforts by a
handful of environmental organization to counterbalance regulated firms’
influence.217  This does not mean that the environment always loses.  But
it does mean that regulated firms seize nearly every opportunity for
obstruction available to them, so that ease of regulation matters to its
success.218    
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220 The phrase comes from a reversed District of Columbia Circuit decision, incorrectly
holding that the nondelegation doctrine requires that Congress establish a “determinate
criterion” to govern agency regulation.  See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
The feasibility constraint focuses analytical attention on costs
likely to be significant, in the sense of having a distribution likely to have
a serious impact on people’s lives.  It avoids lavishing administrative
resources on calibrating responses to what one might call de minimus
costs. 
The feasibility principle offers an appropriate response to
problems characterized by de minimis cost and concentrated harms.  It
calls for stringent regulation.219  On the other hand, it constrains
regulation when the costs concentrate in ways likely to produce greater
than de minimis impacts.
E. The Problem of Giving Agencies Meaningful Guidance.
I will argue in the next section that the feasibility principle
provides more meaningful guidance to agencies than CBA does.  Here, I
set the stage for this comparison by discussing the extent to which the
feasibility principle provides meaningful guidance to administrative
agencies.  
The feasibility principle does not provide a “determinate
criterion,”220 a verbal formulation that tells an agency precisely what
standard to set in every situation.  In this respect, it differs not at all from
other verbal formulations employed to govern standard setting by
administrative agencies, including formulations based on CBA. 
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But in many cases, the feasibility principle seems rather
determinative.  When the projected cost of a regulation does not seem
likely to cause plant closures, the feasibility principle requires the most
stringent regulation that the technology constraint allows.  This should be
a measurable number determinable from examination of technology.221  In
practice, however, technological evaluation involves some judgment.  It
is rarely possible to test all technological options at all facilities, so
administrative agencies must frequently make judgments about what is
feasible based on data from a handful facilities and some kind of
model.222  Still, given the limited capacity of words of general
applicability to capture all future situations under them, the feasibility
principle provides a lot of guidance when only the technological
constraint is at issue.  
The cost constraint, however, appears much less precise.  The cost
constraint amounts to a presumption against “widespread” plant
shutdowns.  This does allow a few marginal plants to shut down.223  But
the term “widespread” certainly raises a significant question.  It does not
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tell us how many plant shutdowns pose a problem triggering a constraint
on the stringency of regulation.224
 But this ambiguity only arises when agencies predict at least some
plant closures.  Historically, government agencies often finds that the
costs of available technological options pose no likelihood of plant
closures.225  This may seem surprising to some, but historically
environmental regulations have imposed tiny costs compared to big items
like labor, material, and transportation costs.226  So, the cost constraint
unambiguously allows strict regulation in many situations.  Still, the cost
constraint does not provide precise guidance when EPA predicts plant
closures from imposition of available technology.
Agency practice, however, suggests that the concept of avoiding
widespread plant closures does provide some consistency in decision-
making, usually confining the number of plant closures to a rather narrow
range.  The number of plant closures usually ranged from 0 to 3% in
cases where the courts mentioned the number of plant closures.227  While
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few or no closures have been the norm, EPA expected a few regulations
of exceptionally dirty (and marginal) industries to close up to 14% of an
industry grouping.228  Since industry would tend to attack plant closures
in court, this sample of agency practice provides a reasonably good proxy
for the whole of it.  These numbers likely exaggerate the number of plant
closures, since agencies regularly overestimate compliance costs.229
Many decisions under feasibility-based statutory provisions close
no plants at all.  This raises the possibility that agencies often shirk their
duty to maximize emission reductions up to the point where widespread
closures occur.  
Congress addressed this problem through use of a “follow-the-
leader” principle. Legislative history to the Clean Water Act and judicial
interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act calls for
implementing agencies, at a minimum, to require the reductions that the
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best-controlled plant in an industry have achieved.230  Congress has
tended to assume that pollution sources can achieve what the leading
companies achieve without shutting down, or that shutdowns of the most
antiquated plants are justified.  Reviewing courts, however, have allowed
industry to secure remands of standards on the basis of claims that the
agency has not adequately demonstrated that some subset of industry can
regularly achieve what the leaders can achieve.231  Congress responded to
the resulting problem of inadequate stringency with some codification of
this follow the leader principle.  Thus, the 1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act require existing sources of hazardous air emissions to meet the
limits the average of the best performing 12% achieve, regardless of
cost.232  On the other hand, Congress has authorized EPA to avoid
shutdowns that might occur through a follow the leader approach when it
determines that the physical characteristics of the laggard plant varies
significantly from those of the leading plants.  These subcategorization
provisions and practices allow avoidance of plant shutdowns, if there is
some physical reason why regulators should not treat plants alike,
 THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE 47
233 See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 297-300 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(adjudicating dispute about subcategorization).
234 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 488, 530-31 n. 55
(1981) (OSHA interpretation of the feasibility principle as protecting the industry’s long-
term profitability is consistent with the statute’s plain meaning, but the court does not
decide whether OSHA could shut down an industry), 
235 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (EPA
administrator eschews standards that would be “greater than the industry could bear and
survive.”).
236 JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 2 (1988).
Cf. McGarity, supra note 152, at 192-93 (overly broad mandates cannot be the exclusive
cause of underregulation).
notwithstanding the desire for a level playing field.233      In spite of the
robustness of the cost and technology restraints, I have framed the cost
constraint weakly as a “presumption”, not a rule, against widespread
plant closures.  This formulation reflects the failure of the legislation to
specifically require avoidance of widespread plant closures, while
suggesting such a prohibition through the feasibility principle.234
This presumption, however, functions much like an iron clad rule. 
Any time an agency predicts that its regulation will cause widespread
closure of facilities, it will face enormous pressure to soften that
regulation.  The agency itself may shy away from such consequences
before any pressure is brought to bear, because its staff understands that
plant closures can involve hardships for workers, even if only
temporary.235  Indeed, EPA has regularly refrained from regulating at all
and engaged in quite indefensible statutory interpretations to avoid
shutdowns under health-based statutory provisions that seemed to require
shutdowns when needed to fully protect public health.236  For this reason,
it is fair to reframe the feasibility principle as a very strong presumption
against widespread plant closures.
This presumption, however, gives rise to an obvious question. 
Under what circumstances should the agency overcome the presumption? 
Because the political constraints on agency shutdown of plants are so
formidable, this obvious question matters little in practice.  One should
distinguish between marginal problems with any proposal and problems
going to the heart of the matter.  But this question still deserves an
answer.
The follow the leader principle provides one possible answer to
this.  Equity between competitors and the creation of a healthy dynamic
of improved pollution control over time may require risking widespread
shutdowns to avoid putting the leaders in pollution control at a
competitive disadvantage.  Another possible answer is that elected
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officials, rather than administrative agencies, should decide when to shut
down an industry, since only elected officials can handle the trade-offs
appropriately.  Congress has, for example, coupled pollution reduction
programs with assistance to workers likely to be displaced and to small
businesses that might have trouble paying for pollution control.237  This
sort of creative solution to tough dilemmas lies beyond the authority of
agencies.   In any event, the feasibility principle provides significant
guidance, but does not provide a determinative criterion for setting
standards
I do not claim that this feasibility principle offers a perfect ideal
for regulation.238  I make a more modest claim.  The feasibility principles
reflects a reasonable Congressional judgment about how agencies should
address the cost of environmental regulation.  One should note that this
principle exists alongside law that provides for important exceptions to
the feasibility principal.  First, statutes contain delisting provisions to
avoid regulation of pollution that obviously has no significant effect on
public health or the environment.239  Second, agencies themselves do not
list pollutants in the first place without scientific information linking
them to potentially serious health or environmental effects.240  Third,
Congress, states, and EPA may  choose more demanding requirements for
particular substances than the feasibility principle might induce (albeit
not under statutory provisions embodying the feasibility principle).  This
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means that opportunities exist to overcome a problem with the feasibility
principle, its failure to demand widespread shutdowns when justification
for such drastic action may exist.
Congressional adoption of the feasibility principle does provide
some meaningful guidance for decision-makers, even though it leaves
some latitude for agency discretion.  This modest claim suggests that the
feasibility principle serves both democratic values and hopes for sensible
regulation reasonably well.  The principle has more to offer than many
advocates of regulatory reform have realized.  
III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
This part explains CBA.  It also reviews some of the principle
rationales economists and legal scholars have offered for it.
A. CBA:  A Description.
Cost-benefit analysis is a form of analysis.  Most scholars
recommending CBA for environmental, health, and safety regulation
argue that agencies should “consider” CBA.241  They generally say little
or nothing about how precisely CBA should influence outcomes under
technology-based provisions (or any other statutory provisions).  A
mandate to consider CBA does not provide any guidance about the
content of decisions.242  An agency can, in principle, consider CBA, and
conclude that the duty to protect public health is paramount and the costs
should be ignored.  Conversely, it could conclude that the existence of
any cost at all should wholly defeat any environmental regulation.   The
requirement to consider an analysis, of any kind, does not provide
meaningful guidance about how the agency should respond to the
analysis.
One should distinguish CBA from a cost-benefit criterion.  A
requirement that agencies set costs equal to benefits would constitute a
CBA criterion and would provide some guidance for decision-makers if
coupled with some methodologies for estimating benefits.243  This would
require agencies to choose the standard that matched projected costs and
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244 Cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (rejecting
a similar criterion).
245 See CROSS, supra note 23, at 81 (discussing Justice Breyer’s overly broad
conception of CBA). 
246 See Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 413, n. 50 (5th
Cir. 1980) (conflating feasibility and cost-benefit analysis prior to correction in the
Supreme Court Donovan decision); Turner Co., Div. of Olin Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 561
F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977) (same).
247 See, e.g. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 982 n. 26 (11th Cir. 1992) (analysis of
economic feasibility does not entail cost-benefit analysis).
248 See, e.g., American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner J.) (OSHA may not compare costs to benefits in establishing feasibility standards
under the Occupational Safety Health Act).
249 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1553 (CBA demands reduction,
as far as possible, of the advantages and disadvantages of environmental regulation to
“dollars and cents”) Geistfeld, supra note 200, at 120 (claiming that CBA deems regulation
desirable if benefits outweigh costs); CROSS, supra note 23, at 81 (defining CBA as
including “at least some attempt” to quantify costs and benefits for purposes of
comparison).
250 See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 229, at 2003, 2005 (explaining that EPA
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benefits, and preclude more or less stringent standards.  Similarly, a
requirement that costs not grossly exceed benefits would provide some
guidance, limiting stringency in some fashion.244  While it would provide
no guidance at all about how to choose among several different
requirements that provided benefits equal to or less than cost, it would
provide some vague guidance in how to treat options that would generate
costs exceeding benefits.  In addressing those options, the agencies
should determine whether the accedence is gross, and reject stringent
options that would generate costs far in excess of benefits. 
Some scholars seem to regard any cost-sensitive analysis or
criteria as CBA.245  Under this view, feasibility analysis would constitute
a form of CBA.246  This article rejects this view.  For analysis of costs that
does not seek to quantify the “benefits” (really incremental harm
reduction) of regulation should not qualify as CBA.247  Most participants
in the regulatory process and environmental specialists would reject the
view that any cost-sensitive analysis involves CBA.248  
Well-informed precise legal scholars usually define CBA as
analysis comparing the costs of regulation to its “benefits” with emphasis
on quantifying both factors.249  This article will employ this definition.
The analysis of regulatory costs necessary for CBA resembles
feasibility analysis.  The analyst must begin by identifying technically
feasible pollution control technologies.250  The analyst then estimates the
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guidelines require costing of pollution control technologies, including the sometimes
negative cost of pollution prevention).
251 Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1557 (costs can be estimated by
researching available technologies and business strategies for compliance). 
252 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 99-100.
253 See, e.g. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (statutory
provision requiring an ample margin of safety from toxic pollutants does not require
consideration of cost or technological feasibility).
254 I do not mean to suggest that this task does not have its fair share of difficulties.
See, e.g., Parson, supra note 52, at 92 (discussing the problem of agency reliance on
regulated industry for information about the capabilities of technology); Houck, supra note
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cost of deploying these technologies.251  These steps allow the analyst to
estimate the cost of achieving a given level of emission reductions.   The
analyst must then determine what pollution reductions these technologies
would achieve, just as a regulator setting a technology-based performance
standard would.  This makes it possible to estimate the amount of
emission reductions associated with a particular cost, the first step in
correlating costs and benefits for a particular regulation.  
The point that any cost estimate must begin with technological
assessment is important, because some regulatory reformers make
arguments that appear to stem from a failure to understand this point.  For
example, Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein write that a technology-based
approach fails to focus attention on “what levels or reduction are
appropriate”, but instead focuses “on the nearly impenetrable question of
what technologies are now available.”252  If this question of technological
availability is impenetrable, then both CBA and feasibility analysis are in
trouble, because they both require assessment of the existence,
capabilities, and cost of available technologies.  Feasibility-based
regulation requires regulators to set levels based on the capabilities of
technology and to figure out the cost of employing the technology to
evaluate whether the cost makes widespread plant closures unlikely. 
Cost-benefit analysis requires assessing the capabilities of technology in
order to arrive at cost estimates and to quantify the amount of reduction
associated with that cost, the first step in arriving at a benefits estimate. 
Furthermore, a cost-benefit criterion and the feasibility principle both
provide guidance in choosing the appropriateness of levels of reductions;
they just reflect different views about the proper criterion for determining
appropriateness.  Only a cost-blind approach can avoid the question of
technological availability.253  Fortunately, the task of determining what
technologies are available has proven relatively easy.254   
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78, at 462 (industry has challenged virtually every regulation the EPA has issued under the
major environmental statutes).  But these difficulties are much more minor than those
facing regulators trying to determine what level of regulation protects public health or the
environment, and far easier than quantifying the benefits of a particular regulation.  See
generally Wagner, supra note 23, at 94-96 (technology-based standards promulgated at
three to ten times the rate of the alternatives); Houck, . 
255 Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 293 (1996) [hereinafter, Constitutional Moments](calling for a
“disaggregated qualitative description of proposed government action”); McGarity,
Regulatory Analysis, supra note 23, at 1253-1254 (identifying executive orders mandating
CBA with “comprehensive” rationality); MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra
note 23 (discussing in detail CBA guided by a vision of comprehensive rationality);
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 106-07 (define CBA as a “full accounting”
of the consequences of “risk reduction”).
256 See McGarity, Cost-Benefit State, supra note 1, at 15 (more “ambitious” cost
assessments may consider the impact of regulation upon employment). 
257 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 111.
258 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 560-62.
259 McGarity, Cost-Benefit State, supra note 1, at 12 (CBA in the health and
environmental context “begins with quantitative risk assessment); See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS (1983).
260 See McGarity, Cost-Benefit State, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing data gaps
rendering risk assessments incomplete and inaccurate); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by
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Most advocates of CBA seem to envision quite comprehensive
analysis, although they rarely specify precisely what they think CBA
should analyze.255  Hence, CBA might well include comparison of the
costs of regulation to the profits of plants to estimate the employment
impacts of regulation, as feasibility analysis does.256  Cass Sunstein, for
one, has explicitly stated that CBA should include information about
whether regulation will lead to lost jobs.257  Certainly anybody who
considers the distribution of costs important (as many CBA proponents
do these days) would want to consider this important aspect of
distribution.     CBA requires an additional intricate step, the
estimation of the value of regulatory benefits.  The analysis of “benefits”
focuses on trying to quantify the value of the averted harm from the
decrease in emissions the particular regulation will bring.258
The attempt to quantify averted harm (benefits) relies heavily
upon quantitative risk assessment.259  Quantitative risk assessment usually
involves the extrapolation of potential consequences of regulation from
very incomplete data about the health effects of pollution, the amount of
exposure people experience, and potential environmental effects.260 
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Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality
Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 120-192 (2001) (describing in detail the data gaps
and judgments needed to assess risk under the Food Quality Protection Act).   
261 See, e.g., Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 14, at 732-33 n. 21 (discussing the
uncertainties and the data undergirding regulation of vinyl chloride); Houck, supra note 78,
at 415 (describing the process of deriving risk assessments for human beings from animal
studies as involving “more guesswork than a television game show”); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law:  A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 562, 572 (1992) (the National Academy of Sciences has identified 50
“inference options,” where a policy decision must be made to extrapolate a risk assessment
from limited data); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (1995) (discussing the problem of extrapolating human health
effects from high dose animal experiments).
262 See McGarity, supra note 82, at 2348 (poor understanding of carcinogenesis hinders
characterization of a dose-response curve to use for extrapolation); Babich, supra note 182,
at 142-145 (most risk assessment does not consist of good reliable science, because
scientifically rigorous testing of human health effects is unethical); Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 1027, 1064 (1990) (risk
assessment is not a “neutral science” or “well-mastered art”); Synthetic Organic Chemical
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3rd Cir. 1974) (extrapolation from findings
of carcinogenicity in animals to conclusions about humans “is not really a factual matter.”).
Cf.  SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 7 (characterizing public responses to
risk as “intuitive toxicology” and suggesting, wrongly, that CBA reliably distinguishes
between big and large problems).
263 See McGarity, Cost-Benefit State, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing lack testing
vehicles for many ecological or health risks); Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing
Risk, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 405, 413-14 (1995) (book review); Regulatory Reform:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Government Affairs, 104th Cong. 122 (1995)
(statement of Linda Greer, Ph.D. Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council). 
264 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
(continued...)
Extrapolating the number of cancer cases, for example, that a particular
regulation of a carcinogen would avoid involves hundreds of debatable
inferences from incomplete data, often data limited to other species or
much higher doses of a chemical than most people need worry about.261 
Since we do not know enough about the mechanisms of cancer to know
how to properly make these extrapolations, the creation of assumptions
involves “intuitive toxicology,” which reflects more policy judgment than
science.262  For many non-carcinogenic effects an estimate of quantitative
impacts is simply impossible.263  At best, the outcome of most
quantitative risk assessment involves very questionable estimates of the
number of cases of some illnesses (such as cancer) coupled with a listing
of effects that cannot be quantified, but may prove quite serious (such as
birth defects).264
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(1994) [hereinafter NRC, JUDGMENT]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983) (calling for disclosure
of the substantial uncertainties undergirding risk assessments); John S. Applegate, The
Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,  Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances
Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Hornstein, supra note 261; Thomas O. McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Quality
Questions: Regulating Carcinogens at EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J.  729 (1979); Wagner,
supra note 261; Houck, supra note 78, 414-15 (laws requiring risk assessment demand
more specificity than science can deliver); McGarity, supra note 82, at 2351-52 (pointing
out that policy judgment is necessary to choose a model of responses to doses of a
chemical, when data do not reveal the shape of the dose response curve; and noting non-
quantified health effects in rulemaking on arsenic).   
265 See Posner, supra note 15, at 1144 (CBA reduces advantages and disadvantages of
a decision to a “numerical metric”).  Cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,
1361 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting industry demand that EPA quantify benefits of a particular
effluent reduction, because “such benefits cannot be reduced to dollars and cents.”).    
266 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108
YALE L. J. 1911 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 189 (2000); MARG SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988) (arguing that
reliance upon preferences makes no sense); Armatya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUDIES 931 (2000); Henry Richardson, The Stupidity of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUDIES 971 (2000); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 14, 734-35
(criticizing use of “wage premiums” as basis for dollar estimates of the value of human life
and application of discount factors); McGarity, supra note 82, at 2353-54 (discussing
EPA’s failure to make adjustments to value of deaths to take into account numerous
relevant factors, because of lack of adequate data and policy agreement about how to do
so); McGarity, supra note 2, at 171 (arguing that “wage premiums” are not set by
willingness to accept risk, but by the unemployment rate and the level of desperation of
currently employed workers).
267 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at 20.
268 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 82, at 2274, 2282-83 (mentioning non-quantified
benefits, but then only addressing some, and those only by indicating ways of trying to
quantify them).
269 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
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CBA proponents contemplate comparison of costs to benefits.  To
facilitate comparison, analysts attempt to place a dollar value on the
averted harms, such as deaths and illnesses.265  The methodologies for
doing this involve numerous highly questionable value assumptions.266  
Most CBA proponents expect agencies to compare the non-
quantified benefits to costs, not just the quantified ones.267  But they have
nothing to say about how this could be rationally done.268  Critics of CBA
charge that environmental harms, especially those least amenable to
quantification, receive short shrift in any process employing CBA.269
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PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207 (2004) (the Office of Management
and Budget treats monetized benefits as “absolute upper limits, and gives the back of the
hand to unquantified values.”); Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1579-1580
(discussing tendency to ignore problems resisting quantification); Shapiro & McGarity,
supra note 14, at 733 n. 26 (discussing “the economist’s tendency to ` dwarf soft variables’
that do not lend themselves to precise quantitative analysis); Lawrence Tribe, Ways Not to
Think About Plastic Treas: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L. J. 1315,
1318-19 (1974) (pressure to base solutions to problems on “hard” data in order to appear
objective can cause policy analysts to overlook “fragile” values).
270 Cf. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 294 (suggesting, wrongly, that
a book defending cost-benefit analysis places science at the center of risk regulation law).
271 See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 229, at 2000 (describing both benefits and
cost estimates as projections).
272 Id. (describing the benefit analysis as “laden with uncertainties” and not dependent
“to any large degree upon empirical analysis”).
273 NRC, JUDGMENT, supra note 264, at 2 (discussing reliance on high dose toxicity
testing in animals); Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992,
33,994  (Sept. 24, 1986) (discussing reliance upon data about increased incidence of tumors
in rodents as dosages increase).  See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride,
56 Fed Reg. 57,036, 57, 071-72 (Nov. 7, 1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, 1915,
1926) (discussing evidence of methylene chloride causing lung and liver tumors in
rodents); 
274 Accord Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1581; Wagner, supra note 23,
at 96 (work associated with promulgating technology-based standards is several times
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One final point, CBA does not present information in the sense of
known observed facts about pollutants or the consequences of
regulation.270  Instead, it presents a set of projections several steps
removed from facts.271  The distance separating estimate from fact
becomes especially great when regulators seek to quantify the harms a
proposed regulation averts.272  The known facts may involve little more
than the tabulation of tumors in laboratory rodents of various types
exposed to high levels of some suspected carcinogen.273  When the
analyst projects a dollar value for the health benefits of regulation to
human beings (for example), that dollar value is not a fact and indeed
draws attention from the relative paucity of factual information available
for risk assessment.  The benefit estimate is an extrapolation, that must,
of necessity, rely upon unproven assumptions to get from such a thin
factual base to such a sweeping conclusion about the effects of a
particular regulation on human beings. 
Subsequent discussion will rely upon one point the foregoing
should make abundantly clear.  CBA is a much more complicated form of
analysis than feasibility analysis.274  CBA involves all of the steps needed
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simpler than work associated with cost-benefit or science-based standards).
to perform a feasibility analysis and many additional, complicated, and
controversial, steps.
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275 See Driesen, supra note 4, 577-79 (describing the theory); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (1975); E.J. MISHAN,
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1982).
276 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 578-79, 582-83.
277 See McGarity, Strategies, supra note 2, at 167 (view of regulation as a by product
of “market failure” leads to policy of intervention based on willingness to pay).  Cf.
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1556-1557 (CBA rests on analogizing
government to business production decisions).
278 See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 275, at 23 (misallocation of resources fixed by
charging a price equal to social cost).
279 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 578-79 (explaining the theory by which private
preferences become the constituents of efficiency).
280 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 4, at 589-92 (by accepting willingness to pay
measures, CBA transfers rights to polluters and diminishes the value of health and
environmental protection); McGarity, Strategies, supra note 2, at 170-71 (discussing the
reasons for discrepancies between willingness to pay and willingness to accept); MISHAN,
supra note 275, at 171 (noting wealth limits price somebody will pay for a good but the
price she may demand for foregoing a good “can be infinite.”); JULES COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 71 (1988) (reconciling this point with the Coase
theorem); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981) (arguing that the outcomes of CBA are indeterminate in
B. The Economic Theory Supporting CBA.
The idea of CBA for environmental, health, and safety regulation
comes from neoclassical economic theory.275  That theory posits that in a
perfectly efficient market the costs consumers pay to obtain goods and
services will equal the benefits they receive from them.276  Economists
apply this approach by analogy to government regulation, treating
government regulation, not as harm avoidance, but as a type of
transaction purchasing a benefit.277  Neoclassical economic theory posits
that allocatively efficient regulation requires that the cost of
environmental regulation equal the benefits derived from it.278
     This theory uses consumer “preferences” to measure the value of
benefits, whether those benefits derive from a consumer purchase or a
government regulatory program.279  Neoclassical theory posits that
rational perfectly informed consumer preferences tell us the value of a
given good or service, and that this is the appropriate guide for economic
analysis.  Consumers “reveal” these preferences by their willingness to
pay a cost for a benefit, or by their willingness to accept payment for a
loss.  A standard criticism of economic efficiency claims that gross
disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures
renders CBA radically indeterminate.280  In practice, CBA proponents
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theory).
281 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 222 (willingness to pay is the
generally employed measure); McGarity, Strategies, supra note 2, at 170 (explaining that
the price a pollution victim will pay to avoid pollution is much lower than what a company
would have to pay her to give up her right to be free of pollution).
282 See, e.g., Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 462; Adler & Posner, supra
note 14, at 168. 
283 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 195 (rejecting the notion that benefits
in excess of costs indicates that a project is a good one, even prima facie).
284 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1106 (explaining why they and many
academic commentators find preferences a poor basis for government policy).
285 See Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 51, 63
(1998) (choosing heroin does not necessarily make one better off).
286 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988).
287 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends Upon Fairness:
A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002); Jules L. Coleman, The
Grounds of Welfare, 12 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003) (book review); Douglas A. Kysar, Law,
Environment, and Vision, 97 N. W. U. L. REV. 675 (2003); JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS AND THE LAW (1988); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988);
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:  Challenging the Neoliberal
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 INDIANA L. REV. 783 (2003). 
usually choose willingness to pay for environmental benefits as the
measuring rod, which decreases the value of benefits from what a
willingness to accept criterion would indicate.281
   The theory that the cost of each regulation should never exceed its
benefits as revealed through study of consumer preferences has not fared
well, even among active supporters of regulatory CBA.  Many supporters
of regulatory CBA believe that the distribution of cost matters.282  And
taking the distribution of costs seriously is inconsistent with insisting that
the total costs not exceed the total benefits of each regulation.283      
Supporters of CBA have also questioned CBA’s reliance upon
“preferences.”284  They have pointed out that people do not always choose
what’s good for them, even when well informed.  Some people have a
revealed “preference” for addictive drugs.  Does it follow that we should
encourage drug use if the costs of providing the narcotics is low
enough?285  And it’s not clear, as a philosophical matter, why preferences
should determine public policy.286             
A debate about the value of economic efficiency has raged in the
legal academy.287  This article will not enter into this wider debate in a
general way.  Rather, this article focuses upon the reasoning of scholars
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288 See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Williams, J., concurring) (arguing that costly regulation can kill more people than it saves
by reducing wealth); American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1993)
(costs of rule for medical establishment will raise costs and decrease demand for medical
services, and may therefore kill people). 
289 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1561 (discussing John Graham’s
characterization of regulation as “statistical murder.”); SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra
note 2, at 136-141; STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 23 (1993) (claiming that costs of environmental cleanup can
deprive individuals of income and lead to poor diet, heart attacks, and suicide); Aaron
Wildavsky, Searching for Safety 61 (1988); Robert Hahn, Randall Lutter & W. Kip
Viscusi, DO FEDERAL REGUATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? (2000).
290 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 125 (associating job loss
from regulation with suicide, and crime).
291 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 42-49.
292 See id. at 46 (correlation between wealth and health virtually disappears at incomes
over $20,000).
293 See id.  See also Paul Krugman, For Richer:  How the Permissive Capitalism of the
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who reject economic efficiency as a rationale for CBA of government
regulation, but embrace CBA nonetheless.  
C. The Job Loss Scenario.
The goal of avoiding job loss figures prominently among the
justifications for CBA.  Conservative think tanks, a few judges,288 and
prominent academics such as Kip Viscusi, Cass Sunstein, Harvard Law
Professor and Justice Stephen Breyer, and John Graham (former head of
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis and current head of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and
Budget) all claim that environmental regulation kills people.289  In
explaining how this could occur, they focus upon a scenario with job loss
at the heart of it.  They claim that government regulation reduces wealth. 
This reduction in wealth, they say, can lower life expectancy, since a
correlation exists between wealth and health.  To illustrate this claim,
they discuss a correlation between loss of employment and suicide.290 
Many of these writers claim that the richer is safer argument justifies
CBA.    
Professor McGarity has shown that the richer is safer argument is
generally specious.291   While the poor live less long than others, marginal
differences in income have little effect upon health.292  The correlation
between wealth and health virtually disappears at incomes exceeding
$20,000.293  Moreover, environmental regulation, even costly
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Boom Destroyed American Equality, N.Y. TIMES, October 20, 2002, Magazine, at 67, 76
(the United States citizens have a lower life expectancy than citizens of many countries
with lower per capita incomes).
294 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 45-48.
295 See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 200, at 126 (assuming that complete pursuit of safety
would prove so expensive that it would make no money at all available for pursuing health
and safety through non-regulatory programs).  Geistfeld has no argument, empirical or
otherwise, showing that a thorough going pursuit of health protection would have this
consequence.  Nor does Kip Viscusi, whom he cites.  See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of
Unbounded Commitment to Regulate Risks, in  RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING
BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION, 135 (Robert W. Hahn, ed., 1996).  Of course, this
article focuses on feasibility limited regulation, not thorough-going pursuit of health
protection.  
296 SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at x [emphasis added].
297 Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is the title of the regulatory reform vehicle
introduced in the 104th Congress to create a thorough-going cost-benefit state, the Job
Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995).
298 See Impact of Kyoto Agreement on Emission Reduction: Before the House
Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William O’Keefe,
executive vice president and chief operating officer of the American Petroleum Institute
(API)) (claiming that significant carbon dioxide reductions over a decade would cost more
than a million jobs); Impact of Global Trade on Trade Agreements: Before the Committee
on Senate Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
110th Cong. (2003) (statement of Franklin J. Vargo, Vice President, International
Economic Affairs National Association of Manufacturers) (“regulatory systems” retard
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environmental regulation, does not necessarily diminish wealth.294 Yet,
commentators continue to employ these arguments in debates about
safety, health, and environmental regulation.295   
In spite of this refutation of the richer is safer argument,
academics repeat it, usually without even considering Professor
McGarity’s response.  Perhaps an intuition about the plausibility of
suicide or health decline in the face of job loss explains this continued
faith, if not the failure to respond to cogent criticism from one of the
field’s leading scholars.  Indeed, Cass Sunstein has framed the richer is
safer hypothesis as the view that people who “have less money and who
are unemployed, tend to live shorter lives.”296  In this way, the job loss
possibility has figured prominently in justifications for CBA.  The
influence of the job loss scenario on policy arguments for CBA among
policy-makers is even greater297.  For that reason claims about job loss
have become a staple of corporate lobbying and the claims of the think
tanks regulated companies finance.298  The job loss scenario figures both
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growth and destroy jobs); Sharon Begley, Too Much Hot Air (Global Warming Policy),
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 49 (industry and conservative think tanks estimate that
implementing the Kyoto Protocol would produce the loss of 600,000 jobs).  Cf. Bruce D.
Fisher, The Ethical Consumer: A Rejecter of Positive Law Arbitrage, 25 SETON HALL L.
REV. 230, 238, n. 22 (1994) (environmental regulation may become a
scapegoat for companies laying off workers for other reasons).
299 See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1493 (arguing that expensive
regulation may increase unemployment and hence poverty).  Cf. id. at 1493 n. 16 (noting,
only in the footnote, that high regulatory costs may increase employment).
300 See SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at 25-26 (questioning
neoclassical assumptions and then stating that the “strongest arguments” for CBA reflect
“common sense, informed by behavioral economics and cognitive psychology.”); Sunstein,
Constitutional Moments, supra note 255, at 253  (CBA would be undesirably if it lead to
implementation based on economic efficiency concepts rooted in willingness to pay).  Cf.
Sunstein, Relative Position, supra note 15, at 331 (criticizing regulations as having high
costs not justified by corresponding benefits).
301 SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at 8-9; Sunstein, Constitutional
Moments, supra note 255, at 290 (discussing environmental law’s “distributive” goals
approvingly).
302 See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1498 (CBA is a tool and a procedure,
not a rigid formula to determine outcomes); Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 195
(describing CBA as a “decision procedure” not as a criterion).
303 Cf. Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that requirement that agency consider costs and benefits did not yield any particular test).
in neoclassical efficiency-based arguments for CBA and in the alternative
justifications that this article focuses upon.299
D. Arguments of CBA Supporters Who Reject its Neoclassical Foundation
A number of scholars claim to reject the neoclassical foundation
for CBA, but recommend it on new grounds, nonetheless.300  These
scholars have in common a view that the distribution of cost matters.301 
These proponents of soft CBA often embrace cost-benefit
analysis, rather than a cost-benefit criterion.  They claim that agencies
should conduct and “consider” CBA.302  Their writing often says  nothing
about what this consideration should consist of or how CBA should
interact with the feasibility principle, or for that matter, any other criteria
found in regulatory statutes.  I will refer to this feature of their writing as
the “indeterminancy feature.”303
But these scholars sometimes ameliorate this indeterminancy
feature through proposal of a presumptive criterion, which I will call the
presumptive position.  They propose that an agency explain “how” the
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benefits exceed costs.304  If costs outweigh benefits, a presumption
against “proceeding” should apply.305  The agency could overcome the
presumption against the promulgation of regulation on distributional or
some other grounds.306  And a recent book by Professor Sunstein goes
further, suggesting that courts should invalidate regulations producing
costs greatly exceeding benefits.307 This position presumes that a cost-
benefit criterion should apply, but allows for some exceptions on
distributional grounds.  This proposal converts CBA from a consideration
into a criterion presumptively determining the results of regulation.
 A survey of some of the most prominent rationales these CBA
proponents advance follows.  My main goal here involves giving the
reader a sufficient understanding of the principal points these writers
make to ground an analysis of the question of whether they have
adequately explained a preference for CBA or a cost-benefit criterion
over a preference for the feasibility principle.
1.  Overall Well-Being – Matthew Adler and Eric Posner claim
that CBA tends to advance “overall well-being.”308  While this may seem
similar to the standard neoclassical claim that CBA advances optimal
pollution levels, Adler and Posner claim that their theory provides a new
rationale for CBA.309  And their argument contains qualifiers that one
would not find in a completely neoclassical position.310
They argue that regulation’s effect on “overall well-being” is
“morally relevant,” but not necessarily decisive.311  Distributive or
deontological considerations (among others) may matter more than a
regulation’s impact on overall well- being.312
They also argue that CBA often, but not always, advances the
goal of overall well-being, if predicated upon desires rather than
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314 Adler & Posner suggest that overall well-being arises from a positive sum of
welfare equivalents, defined as payments sufficient to make the recipient or payor as well
off after the project as before (absent distributive concerns) under the right theory of
individual well being.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1106-07.  This proposal
itself is not a conceptual definition.  It seems to amount to a kind of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency transposed.  But Adler and Posner reject Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  Id. at 1106;
Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 190-91.  Cf.  Posner, supra note 1, at 1156 (finding it
“unlikely” that CBA would pass a pragmatic test if “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has no social
value”).
In a subsequent article, however, Matthew Adler sketches a theory of how one gets
from individual welfare to overall well-being.  Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and
Procedure:  A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLOR. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 289-302
(2000).  But he employs an objectivist approach to these comparisons that would not
approximate the dollar-based comparisons of CBA.  I have argued elsewhere that
compensation for death or serious illness adequate to actually compensate a welfare loss
is impossible.  See Driesen, supra note 4, at 588-89.  Adler and Posner do not explain how
characterizing these losses as welfare equivalents solves this problem.  Nor do they explain
how a welfare gain can exceed a loss without a solution to this. 
315 Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 204-209.
316 Id. at 196.
317 Id. at 196.
318 Id. at 198-199 (explaining the writers’ concept of desire).
preferences.313  They claim that a regulation enhances overall well-being
if the beneficiaries of regulation receive “welfare gains” exceeding the
“welfare losses” of those who pay for regulation.  They only offer a
rudimentary definition of overall well-being: They do not explain
precisely what it means to say that “welfare gains” exceed “welfare
losses” to others when the “losses” involve death, illness, and ecological
destruction.314  But they do explicitly defend the notion that comparison
of one person’s welfare gains to another’s losses is possible.315 
Adler and Posner claim that their conception of CBA differs from
that of traditional economics.316  They do not believe that government
should base its valuation of costs and benefits upon the “unrestricted
preferences” of consumers.317  Rather, they would base valuation of costs
and benefits upon estimates of “desire” for (or against) regulation.318
They embrace agnosticism about the precise content of desire, and
therefore desire-based measurement of costs and benefits, but they reject
using willingness to pay and willingness to accept payments as the
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325 See generally Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 255, at 300
(“calculation of both costs and benefits can be enormously difficult”).  They seem to
recognize the fragility of this point later in the article and rest their case, in part, on an
“assumption” that CBA and other multidimensional procedures only involve the direct
costs of information-gathering and processing.  Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 232-33.
This assumption ignores the long history of CBA creating a very expensive opportunity
cost, the continuation of death and illness during a protracted disputes about the accuracy
of CBA and the total defeat of all regulation, good or bad, for a very long time under
statutory provisions heavily dependent upon it.  See Driesen, supra note 4, at 601-604;
DRIESEN, supra note 206, at 212; McGarity, supra note 82, at 2343 (CBA “thoroughly
stymied government action” under both FIFRA and TSCA); William J. Nicholson & Philip
J. Landrigan, Quantitative Assessment of Lives Lost Due to Delay in the Regulation of
Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 85, 185 (1989) (suggesting
that delay in regulating occupational exposure to benzene causes 30-490 cases of
leukemia). Even without opportunity cost, however, CBA is much more expensive than
feasibility analysis.
326 See Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 225, 231-32.
measuring rod.319   They define desire in terms of having an attitude
favoring or disfavoring a project.320
A major puzzle in this overall well being theory involves the
question of whether his theory supports CBA in a significant number of
cases involving environmental, health, and safety regulation.  Adler and
Posner suggest that it does.321  They argue that CBA might by sufficiently
accurate in tracking “the welfare effect of projects . . . given its relative
cheapness and transparency” to justify its use.322  This suggests that the
judgment about CBA’s value involves a subsidiary judgment that CBA is
more transparent and cheap than, say, the feasibility principle (or
feasibility analysis).323  The relative cheapness point is simply wrong, as
this article has already demonstrated.324  CBA is much more expensive
and difficult than feasibility analysis.325  The transparency claim will
receive more extended treatment as we proceed.
They also argue that CBA more accurately approximates overall
well-being than a feasibility-based “procedure.”326  They equate a
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cost-benefit “requirement” might be more protective than a feasibility requirement in cases
where the benefits outweighed the costs of shutting down facilities).
329 See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1490 (suggesting that CBA might cure
poor priority setting).  See also BREYER, supra note 289 (finding a serious problem of
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330 See, e.g., Tommy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of
Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED:
GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION ch. 8 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
331 See Driesen, supra note 122.
332 See id.
333 Id. at 10004-10008.
334 See id. at 10011-10020.
feasibility requirement with a concern for job security, an analysis this
article agrees with.327  They object to this on the grounds that the
feasibility requirement rejects shutting down an industry, even when the
benefits to “consumers and citizens” would justify the closure.328  Thus,
their view about the relative accuracy of CBA in tracking general welfare
better than a feasibility principle relies, in part, upon a premise that CBA
will lead to desirable shutdowns of an industry that a feasibility approach
would reject.
2.  Priority-Setting. – Almost all regulatory reformers claim that
CBA improves priority setting.329  Specifically, they argue that CBA will
encourage regulators to reallocate resources to better address high priority
health and safety issues.330  I have questioned the view that CBA
reallocates resources from one environmental, health, or safety problem
to another elsewhere.331  CBA of particular regulatory standard setting
decisions does not influence priority setting, at least under a common
sense understanding of priority setting.332  CBA in this context (which is
where it is employed) involves the use of CBA as an aid in making
choices about how much pollution reduction to make from a particular
industry.  Priority setting, however, usually refers to “selection,” the
choosing of items to place on an agenda, or “ordering,” decisions about
which actions on the agenda an agency should accomplish first.333  But
CBA of standards does not address either selection or ordering, except in
the rare case where CBA led to the conclusion that an entire regulatory
activity should be dropped altogether.334  Normally, however, CBA
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122, at 10017.
339 BREYER, supra note 289; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades
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by the National Academy of Sciences).
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influences agency decisions about regulatory stringency, not priority
setting.335 
Regulatory reformers, however, consider CBA a form of priority
setting, because they  imagine that stringency determinations divert
resources from some health and safety priorities to others.336  Thus, they
suggest, for example, that stringent regulation of toxic substances
involves investment of monies that might be better spent on vaccinating
children or automobile safety.337  As Professor McGarity points out, the
reformers do not explain how reductions in stringency lead to fuller
funding of their preferred health and safety priorities.338  The argument
for priority setting rests on the point that in theory reduction in stringency
of one regulation could free up resources to spend on other health and
safety priorities, and that increases in stringency could reduce the
resources for alternative priorities.  
3.  Democracy and Rationality. – Regulatory reformers make a
group of arguments that sound in democracy and/or rationality.  Cass
Sunstein, and Stephen Breyer, for example, argue that public hysteria
unduly influences regulation.339  Professors Sunstein and Kuran have
described a psychological process by which the masses become
convinced that a pollutant is harmful, even though no evidence supports
that belief.  Sunstein seems to assume that hysteria’s influence explains
anomalies he finds in regulatory decisions.340  Sunstein and other
regulatory reformers argue that CBA checks responsiveness to this
hysteria.341 
Conversely, Sunstein argues that CBA aids democratic
accountability.  Sunstein uses the term “democratic accountability” in an
idiosyncratic way.  He does not mean to suggest the bureaucrats should
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343 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at (rejecting a concept of
democracy rooted in government responsiveness to citizens’ demands and arguing that
government should resist ill-informed demands).
344 Cf. McGarity, supra note 260, at 202-20 (identifying transparency with open public
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345 Cf. Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1496 (stating that requiring that an agency
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346 See Posner, supra note 15, at 1141.
347 See id. at 1143.
348 See id. at 1143.
349 See id. at 1147.
350 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 2, at 107.
351 See SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 1, at 9; Hahn & Sunstein, supra
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do what people want.342  Quite to the contrary, he views CBA as a useful
impediment to fulfilling public desires, which he views as frequently
hysterical.343  Instead, he claims that CBA would make the basis for
decisions transparent and thereby aid democratic “accountability.”344  He
does not explain precisely why CBA would aid either transparency or
accountability or what he means by democratic accountability in the
context of administrative rulemaking.345 
Eric Posner echoes this accountability theme and gives it more
specific content.   He claims that CBA ensures that “elected officials
maintain power over agency regulation.”346  CBA, writes Posner, converts
a relationship based on asymmetric information to one based on “full
information.”347  In particular, CBA provides the elected officials with
information that they can use to figure out whether the proposed
regulation is in their interest.348  He claims that CBA performs this
function even when the elected official has no interest in the project’s
efficiency.349  
Sunstein claims that CBA would reduce special interest influence
on legislation.350  While he does not define special interests, he apparently
intends to include environmental groups and industry in this rubric.351   
Again, Eric Posner provides a theory supporting Sunstein’s
assertion.  Professor Posner argues that government possession of CBA
will lessen special interest groups’ ability to gain influence over
politicians by surprising officials with new information that the special
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356 Parker, supra note 74; Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 YALE L. J. 1981 (1998).  See also McGarity, supra note 1, at 36 (showing that Robert
Hahn left out regulations generating enormous benefits in order to manufacture a
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358 Sunstein, Constitutional Moments, supra note 255, at 300.
interests possess.352  By better informing officials, CBA presumably will
partially innoculate them against special interest claims.  
Finally, several CBA proponents claim that CBA will make
decision-making more “rational” and less “ad hoc.”353  They consider
regulations irrational and ad hoc primarily because they generate uneven
ratios of dollars spent to lives saved.354  Paradoxically, most of these
reformers recognize that environmental regulation might rationally
require significant expenditures to protect the environment itself and
prevent non-fatal illnesses, which would suggest that decisions with high
dollars per life saved ratios might by quite rational, but predicated on
harms that do not involve significant likelihood of death.355  Furthermore,
Lisa Heinzerling and Richard Parker have shown that the data from
which they derive their central conclusions suffers from gross defects.356 
Nevertheless, the “soft” cost-benefit advocates use this extremely limited
and questionable data to suggest that regulation without CBA consists
primarily of ad hoc responses to public hysteria and special interest
pressure.357  Conversely, they suggest that CBA involves technocratically
rational decisions insulated from interest group pressure.
4.  Absolutism. – Sunstein claims that “many” statutes “forbid
balancing” and “call for absolutism.”358  Sunstein suggests statutes that
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statutes defined in terms of “health or technology” are “absolutist.”359 
While Sunstein does not explain precisely what he means by absolutism, I
will assume that he would describe a statute that forbids consideration of
cost as absolutist.  But the statutes Sunstein cites authorize or require
consideration of costs most of the time.  For example, the Clean Air Act,
as explained above, contains numerous provisions requiring consideration
of cost, often as part of technology-based setting of specific emission
standards.360 
Some of Sunstein’s more careful later writing refers to the Clean
Air Act provision for setting the NAAQS and the Delaney Clause, which
once wholly prohibited introduction of carcinogenic additives to food, as
examples of absolutism.361  We should therefore understand Sunstein as
objecting to statutory provisions that forbid consideration of cost as
absolutist, rather than as claims about whole statutes.  
Sunstein has also recently recognized that absolutism may be
justified in some circumstances.  He argues that the Endangered Species
Act, which does not permit consideration of costs in many circumstances,
for example, might be justified.362  For present purposes, the main point is
that Sunstein argues that avoidance of absolutism, which apparently
means cost-blindness, justifies CBA.
IV.  CBA AND THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE.
The advocates of CBA who agree that environmental law should
take distribution into account have not adequately explained why they
prefer CBA to the feasibility principle.  I will argue here that the
feasibility principle works well enough in terms of these reformers’ own
criteria for regulation to make their support for CBA difficult to
understand. 
A.  Job Loss and Richer is Safer
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If one assumes that regulatory killing is a serious problem, which is a
very dubious idea, then the feasibility principle offers a more targeted and
effective solution than CBA.  The richer is safer hypothesis relies upon
the proposition that lower individual wealth causes more death and
illness.  Analysis of the cost of a regulation by itself does not tell one
whether it increases or diminishes individual wealth.  A regulation causes
a shift in resources toward environmental, health, and safety priorities. 
Thus, for example, environmental regulation of a company making
widgets, diverts resources from widget making to protection of public
health and the environment.   It does not directly diminish wealth.  For
example, suppose that a company earning ten million dollars must spend
$100,000 annually on regulatory compliance.  The company may increase
wealth by hiring unemployed people to install pollution control
equipment or figure out pollution prevention alternatives.363  The loss of
$100,000 might have some negative effect that might offset the increase
in wealth from the added employment (unless the company avoided the
projected cost through money saving innovation).  The company might
reduce the CEO’s salary, limit dividends to shareholders, raise price for
customers, or lower workers’ salaries.364  But the question of whether
increased cost diminishes or increases the wealth of individuals depends
primarily upon the distribution of costs, not their magnitude.  If the
CEO’s salary gets reduced from 2 million to 1.9 million, this will not
effect health.365  Likewise, even the richer is safer crowd will not usually
posit a health impact from a minor price increase spread over a large
population, or a reduction in dividends.  But a shutdown, with attendant
job losses, might effect health or safety negatively under the richer is
safer argument.  Basically, the distribution of costs proves crucial to the
richer is safer argument.
As I have explained, the feasibility principle focuses upon this
distributional issue by asking whether widespread shutdowns are
possible.  And it provides a restraint designed to address that issue in the
 THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE 71
366 See, e.g., AIR QUALITY STRATEGIES AND STANDARDS DIV., U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS FOR THE PETROLEUM REFINERIES NESHAP 117-119 (1995) (included in the
docket accompanying National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Petroleum Refineries, 60 Fed. Reg. 43244 (August 18, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
59 and 63) (partial equilibrium analysis predicts the loss of 114 jobs from a decline in
production induced by regulation);Effluent Guidelines and Standards; Electroplating Point
Source Category; Pretreatment Standards for Existing Sources, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,590,
52,594 (Sept. 7, 1979) (EPA’s analysis focuses on “the ability of individual plants to bear
the cost of compliance”).
367 See, e.g., EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 366, at 117-119 (partial
equilibrium analysis left out potential gains in employment from operation and
maintenance of pollution control technology and from producers of substitute products and
potential losses from petroleum users and producers of complimentary products);
Electroplating Effluent Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 52,594 (EPA’s analysis did not consider
economic growth from surviving firms that might take up the market share of those that
could stay open and comply).    
scenario most likely implicate the richer is safer argument, the situation
of a regulation leading to significant numbers of lost jobs.  
By contrast, the indeterminate position offers no response to the
richer is safer argument, since it only posits analysis, not a particular
response to the analysis.  Moreover, CBA’s analysis of job loss is
radically ambiguous.  Everything depends upon the framing of the
analysis.  If the agency employs a partial equilibrium analysis (an
analysis focused on the immediate effects of a project) it may conclude
that a regulation leading to plant closures triggers job losses.366  But if the
agency employs a “general equilibrium” analysis (analyzing the project’s
impact upon the economy as a whole) the job losses may disappear.367 
For competitors able to bear the increased cost without firing workers or
using processes that do not trigger comparable regulations may hire more
people to meet the demand the company shutting down operations can no
longer meet.  So a decision-maker considering a project that will
shutdown plants may get a CBA projecting no net job loss or a projected
job loss.  It all depends upon the cognitive heuristics of government
economists.    
The presumptive position does not take a clear stance on the issue
of job loss either.  Indeed, the presumption against regulatory costs
exceeding regulatory benefits might defeat regulation increasing
employment, and thereby making people richer and safer.  Furthermore,
the presumption fails to presumptively stop regulation that would yield
benefits exceeding costs, but would create unemployment implicating the
richer is safer hypothesis.
The proponents of soft CBA have sketched out a flexible enough
position to allow them to claim that they would address this problem as
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well as feasibility analysis does.  But to support this claim, they would
have to specify more precisely how to tailor a cost-benefit criterion
toward that end.  They certainly have given no reason to believe that the
“cost-benefit state”368 responds better to the richer is safer problem than
the feasibility restraint.  And it makes sense for Congress, rather than
technocrats to decide how much emphasis job loss should receive as a
general matter.
B.  Overall Well-Being.
Either Adler and Posner’s concept of overall well-being or their
exceptions to its hegemony can justify feasibility analysis better than
CBA.  Let’s begin with the exceptions.
Adler and Posner recognize that deontological and distributive
considerations may prove more significant than overall well being.369 
That view might well lead to the conclusion that CBA should not apply to
risk regulation.  After all, many scholars believe that the primacy many
existing statutes give to avoiding death, illness, and ecological destruction
does involve equitable and deontological principles.370  Professor Adler
agrees with this conventional view to some degree, for he states that CBA
breaks down for actions involving death.371  And the same reasoning
might apply to illness and some types of ecological harms, such as
elimination of species.372  So, it is not too surprising that Alder,
notwithstanding strong suggestions in his earliest articles that CBA
should apply broadly,373 later states that risk regulation may not be an
appropriate area for CBA.374  Adler and Posner’s  tentative and qualified
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regulators may need to attend to deontological, perfectionist, or distributive criteria, not just
overall well-being).
375 See Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 238-43 (describing their endorsement of
CBA as “tentative”); Matthew D. Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Comment on Johnston, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2002) (CBA may
lower overall well-being).  Cf. Adler, supra note 314, at 312-13 (suggesting that a robustly
deontological view of regulation is wrong, but admitting that he has not shown why that
is so).
376 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, Theories of Punishment and the External Standard,
31 reprinted in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY (Abraham S. Goldstein and Joseph Goldstein
eds. 1971).
endorsement of CBA suggests that they themselves might accept the
proposition that for at least some risk regulation, CBA is not justified.375  
I have already spelled out in some detail a justification for the
view that the feasibility principle handles distributive concerns well. 
Feasibility analysis has the virtue on focusing upon costs and harms that
matter, because of their distribution.  
One might wonder about whether the feasibility principle has any
status as a moral principle.  After all, it does not give avoidance of death
or illness absolute primacy over all considerations.  This, however,
should not disqualify it as based on moral principle.  After all, even the
commandment not to murder (which is relevant to death causing
pollution), does not apply regardless of countervailing considerations. 
Self-defense, for example, can justify murder.376  But the narrowness of
the exceptions to the injunction against murder suggests that only a few
qualitative justifications will do.  One cannot justify murder on the
grounds that the person murdered has no value and irks the murderer,
who is a wonderful person bestowing great gifts upon everyone she
meets.  Perhaps the moral imperative to avoid killing and causing illness
as we produce useful and pleasant things should yield, at least initially, to
some countervailing considerations, but not all.  I cannot defend this view
completely here, but I have said enough to show that Adler and Posner
have not foreclosed the possibility that feasibility might be justified as
better than CBA on distributive or deontological grounds, even under
their own theory, for most, and perhaps all, environmental, safety, and
health regulation.
My claim that the feasibility principle might better track overall
well-being than a cost-benefit criterion requires a little more immersion
in the particulars of Adler and Posner’s views.  In explaining how one
might modify preferences to conform to an appropriate desire-based
measure of well being, they suggest that people experiencing the
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377 See Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 203 (describing the “affect requirement” as
something that perhaps must hold true in order for a desire to improve an individual’s well
being); Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1114 (suggesting that a preferences-based view
might have to modified to require affect and experience).
378 Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 203.
379 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387-88 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (predicting small price changes from implementation of a new source performance
standard).  Cf. Adler, supra note 310, at 1333 (suggesting that only vivid experience
influences welfare).
380 See GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1995) (70 percent of Americans believe that requirements
cannot be too stringent and that improvements must be made regardless of cost).
381 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need
to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 32 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L.
Inst.) 10277, 10285 (2002) (discussing the decrease in electricity prices that followed the
United Kingdoms replacement of 40% of its coal-fired generation with natural gas).
382 Adler & Posner might reject this feeling’s relevance to an assessment of overall
well-being.  They suggest that disinterested or morally motivated preferences should not
(continued...)
consequences of a project must feel something for their desires to have
any impact on overall well-being.377  They label this the “affect
requirement.”378  Most people’s experience with the cost of pollution
control might not meet the “affect” requirement.  The concentration
principle would suggest that few people strongly desire the avoidance of
imposition of cost to achieve pollution reduction goals, at least so long as
products they want do not disappear from the market (something the
feasibility principle guards against).  Many people may not have strong
desires regarding minor changes in prices, the most probable effect of
large regulatory burdens not running up against the feasibility principle’s
cost constraint.379  This lack of affect might help explain why opinion
polls indicate that most people believe that environmental policy should
not take cost into account at all.380  Indeed, since free market innovation
and competition tend to lower prices over time, increased cost from
environmental regulation often limits a drop in price, rather than actually
raising prices in absolute terms.381  When this drop occurs, desire to avoid
the cost will prove almost non-existent, even if the total dollars involved
are large.  
Even for businesses that cannot pass on regulatory costs through
price increases, the compliance requirement may produce a task for
managers, rather than a direct experience having an affect that matters. 
Alternatively, it may produce a feeling of annoyance that bears little
relationship to the cost of compliance.  In some managers, it may even
produce a positive feeling of contributing to social goals.382
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count.  Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1112-13.  This particular example, however,
raises some issues under their theory, because this is not an abstract desire for or against
a project. This is an aspect of the experience of a participant in the project feeling its
effects.  Cf. See Qizilbash, supra note 285, at 58-59 (arguing that the line between self-
regarding and other-regarding desires is not bright).  Some people may reject their view
that moral and disinterested preferences are irrelevant to welfare.  See, e.g., Posner, supra
note 1, at 1168 (questioning the exclusion of the value of fulfilling a duty from CBA). 
 One can argue that in theory even a widely distributed cost might have a horrific effect
upon a particular individual.  A small increase in the price of coca-cola might cause a poor
person to spend her last ten dollars on a six-pack, just before she discovers that she has a
life threatening illness that requires treatment requiring all her resources, plus the $10.00
she just spent on a six pack.  But no regulatory analysis would ever predict this, and if it
tried to, it would stop a lot regulation saving real lives because of fantasies very unlikely
to come into fruition.
383 See Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at 203-04; Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at
1114.
384 See Nussbaum, CBA, supra note 219, at 1021-22 (listing life, bodily health, the
ability “to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature”
as “central human capabilities”).  See also BRYNER, supra note 380, at 1 (70 percent of
Americans believe that requirements cannot be too stringent and that environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost).
385 See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1976); JULIET B.
SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN:  THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991).
Adler and Posner also argue that objective good might matter to
overall well-being, not just preferences.383  Life, health, and good
environmental quality rank high on philosophers’ scale of objective
value.384  And an extensive literature questions the notion that our
accelerating accumulation of goods really makes us better off, even if we
show a preference for the goods we acquire by buying them.385  Even if
some goods and services (such as medicine) improve well-being, many
purchases might fail to objectively improve the lives of purchasers
(consider fatty foods and television).  That failure implies that an
appropriate desire-based measure of well-being might only count a
fraction of environmental regulation’s cost as having a negative influence
upon overall well-being.  This need to disregard much of regulation’s cost
(or even to treat some cost as improving overall well-being, because
raising prices may improve people’s lives by decreasing consumption of
harmful products) suggests that CBA may not track overall welfare as
well as a feasibility principle, which tends to focus on costs that  have
objective importance in pursuing benefits of great objective importance.
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386 See Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1114; Adler & Posner, supra note 14, at
203.
387 Cf. Adler, supra note ?, at 1401 (current formula for calculating death is incorrect).
388 See Broome, supra note 355, at 958 (because people’s preferences regarding risk
are muddled and incoherent, it is implausible to accept their preferences as a proper
valuation of their lives).
389 See, e.g.,W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate,
in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 141-148 (Robert W. Hahn ed. 1996). 
390 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 588-89.  See also Mathew D. Adler, The Puzzle of “Ex
Ante Efficiency”:  Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight, 151 U. PENN. L. REV.
1255 (2003) (arguing against the moral relevance of preferences before the outcomes an
individual’s decision is known).
391 Adler & Posner concede that their concept of welfare equivalents would prove
difficult to calculate.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 119, at 1115.
392 Adler & Posner have claimed that regulators have made many adjustments that
make CBA practice fit their theories better than “textbook CBA.”  See Adler & Posner,
supra note 119, at 1118-1124.  But it does not follow that these adjustments suffice to
make them even approximate overall well-being, as Adler and Posner define it.  Their
claim that it “is likely to” represents a hunch, not a careful comprehensive comparison of
actual CBA to the requirements of a specific theory of desire-based “welfare equivalents.”
Adler & Posner also argue that perhaps only well-informed
desires track well being.386  That principal could defeat the most
important components of modern CBA.387  For example, current estimates
of the value of human life rely upon theories about the uninformed
desires of workers.388  Some economists have claimed that companies pay
workers more to take high risk jobs.  They derive dollar estimates of the
value of human life from data about the claimed differential between high
risk and low risk jobs.389  But nobody claims that the workers accepting
these “risk premiums” know whether or not the jobs they undertake will
kill them, or even know the magnitude of the risk involved.  A worker
knowing that a job would kill him might well turn it down, suggesting,
perhaps, an infinite value for life.390  
The difference between current CBA practice and measurement of
desires under Adler and Posner’s views about well-being (if measurement
is possible under Adler and Posner’s theory)391 seems vast, even
respecting the most easily quantifiable items.  All of these sources of
substantial deviation between current monetization practices and the
well-being theory’s requirements suggest that feasibility analysis might
track overall well being, as they define it, better than CBA.392  Feasibility
analysis measures some relevant welfare equivalents, while CBA
profligately produces numbers deviating so far from a good estimate of
well-being that they grossly mislead regulators.  Furthermore, for reasons
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393 Professor Adler argues that interpersonal comparisons are problematic under views
of well-being that rely upon the preferences used to produce dollar estimates in CBA.  See
Adler, supra note 314, at 295.  So, Adler argues for an objectivist approach to interpersonal
comparison.  Id. at 297.  Under his view, a project positively affects overall well-being if
“everyone” would prefer experiencing losses under project to experiencing the losses
associated with the status quo.  See id. at 299 (explaining this in terms of letter symbols).
Adler concedes that his approach is indeterminate in some cases, where everybody would
not agree about whether it is better to incur the project’s losses or those associated with the
status quo.  Id. at 300.  This lack of agreement  arguably will exist with respect to any
environmental, health, or safety problem.   
394 Because their writing does not define a decision-making procedure, I have assumed
here that agencies employing a cost-benefit decision-making procedure would consider
CBA, but receive no statutory direction about what to do with it.  But Eric Posner also
discusses the possibility of using CBA as a reporting device, which might mean that it
might not be part of agency decision-making.  See Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis
as a Solution to the Principal-Agent Problem, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 289, 295 (2001)
(suggesting the reporting  of CBA to the public as a way of allowing them to evaluate the
work of Congress, the President, and the administrative agencies).  I have some reason to
believe the authors actually meant that a regulation should be issued if the benefits are
greater than the costs, although this is not a natural reading of their written argument. If
they mean by this that a statute would stop a regulation estimated to generate costs in
excess of benefits, at least presumptively, then they are recommending what I have called
a cost-benefit criterion and the “decision-making procedure” locution simply adds
confusion.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 21 (characterizing CBA as a procedural
requirement as a requirement that agencies compile and disclose the analysis).   
set out in the margin, most environmental problems may be indeterminate
in principal with regard to overall well-being as Adler elaborates it.393  
Professors Adler and Posner argue that CBA would lead to
desirable regulation that allowed widespread job loss, which a feasibility
criterion would reject.  They do not explain why and how CBA would
encourage more stringent regulation.  The presumptive position certainly
does nothing to encourage stringent regulation.  For this position only
requires that benefits exceed costs.  If the benefits of a standard
producing widespread shutdowns would produce benefits exceeding
costs, so would a milder standard not requiring shutdowns.  The
presumptive position would not demand pursuing additional worthwhile
benefits for greater cost.  Hence, the presumptive position acts as a one-
way ratchet reducing the stringency of regulation and does nothing to
correct the problem of failing to shut down plants to achieve important
environmental goals.
The indeterminate position would not necessarily lead to
justifiable shutdowns of industry either.  CBA operating as a decision-
making procedure,394 rather than a criterion, would presumably take place
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395 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 554-55 (explaining that CBA usually takes place under
statutes not requiring cost-benefit decision-making).
396 See id. at 582-83.
397 I have found only one example of an agency subject to very little constraint
choosing an approach that promised some shutdowns.  In 1979, EPA chose a best
practicable control technology standard that it estimated might shut down close to 20% of
an industry subcategory.  See Effluent Guidelines and Standards: Electroplating Point
Source Category; Pretreatment Standards for Existing Sources, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,590, 52594
(September 7, 1979).  In choosing this standard, the agency did not quantify the dollar
value of environmental benefits or even quantify the amount of fish saved or illnesses
avoided.  Instead, it estimated the amount of effluent reduction avoided.  Id. at 52,594.  The
third circuit held that this “limited cost-benefit analysis” justified the regulation.  See
National Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds, Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).   
398 See Eric D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget
Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order
12291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RES. J. 1, 55 (1984) (OMB has always used CBA to seek reduction
in regulatory stringency).  EPA employees generally claim that this remains true.  But in
recent years, some analysts have claimed that CBA has been used to encourage regulation.
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing OMB “prompt” letters to encourage
regulations).  I cannot thoroughly address these competing claims in this article, but will
address them in a forthcoming piece of the neutrality of CBA.    
in the context of some statutory criterion,395 which would likely control
the question of whether plant shutdowns are allowed.  
One could solve this problem by requiring that costs equal
benefits.396   This would require more stringent regulation when costs
were too low relative to benefits and matches the demands of economic
theory.  No regulatory reformer, however, has proposed this and it is
inconsistent with Adler and Posner’s rejection of a distribution-blind
economic efficiency rationale.  
With or without CBA, a sufficiently vague statutory provision
would permit an agency to shutdown an industry in order to pursue
environmental goals.397  It seems unrealistic to think that simply writing a
CBA would encourage a legally unconstrained agency to shutdown
plants, since this is a politically difficult act and CBA has usually been
employed to reduce the stringency of regulation.398  Moreover, Adler and
Posner have not explained how an agency should determine when a
shutdown is justified, taking into account distributional issues that they
consider important.  The feasibility principle has the advantage of
including a fairly specific democratic judgment about that issue.
C.  Priority Setting.
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399 See Driesen, supra note 122, at 10020 (CBA will not address a priority setting
problem).
400 See id. at 10018.
401 See Driesen, supra note 4, at 585-87 (explaining why efficient individual
regulations will not lead to efficient outcomes for problems involving some unregulated
pollution sources and multiple regulations).
402 Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, while rejecting CBA, have argued that best
available technology (BAT) regulation, which the feasibility principle governs, is
“inconsistent with sound priority setting.”  See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law:  The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COL. J.
ENVTL. L. 171, 174, 194 (1988).  Their arguments reflect exaggeration of the stringency of
the feasibility principle and other flaws.  They equate the BAT with “regulating to the hilt,”
id. at 174, a locution overlooking the cost and feasibility constraints.  They then argue that
this “regulation to the hilt. . . may prevent an agency from dealing adequately with other
more serious problems that come to scientific attention later.”  Id. at 174-75.  But strict
regulation does not prevent an agency from moving on to new problems.  Indeed, lax
regulation, which has been common, tends to force agencies to address the same problem
over and over again, thus limiting efforts to get on with new problems.  They also suggest
that the large compliance and administrative costs flowing from “BAT” regulation, (which
conforms to the feasibility principle), will force agencies to “limit the number of
substances” they address.  Id. at 175.  This argument seems to eschew strict priority setting
in favor of more comprehensive regulation.  In any event, I have argued elsewhere that an
equation of stringency with large amounts of administrative resources constitutes a
fundamental error, since the complexity of standard setting has more to do with the
complexity of the analysis necessary to reach a result than the stringency of the regulation.
(continued...)
Neither the feasibility nor a cost-benefit criterion affects priority
setting, properly conceived.399  Instead, both influence the stringency of a
particular regulatory decision.400  
But I invite the reader to put aside well justified skepticism about
the reformers’ argument for the sake of comparative analysis.  Assume
that the cost-benefit approach influences priority setting, because money
spent on regulation would flow to some other health or environmental
priority if the regulation is restrained or abandoned.  The same approach
would logically apply to analysis of the feasibility principle’s effect upon
priority setting.  The feasibility would tend to give priority to feasible
regulation.  It would, on the other hand, constrain unfeasible regulation. 
Money would go to other health and safety priorities when the addressing
the existing priority is not feasible.  Given CBA proponents view that
distribution of cost matters, this seems like a reasonable priority setting
approach, especially since stringent regulations for one industry can
compensate for lax regulation in another addressing the same overall
environmental problem.401  Certainly, the regulatory reformers have said
nothing justifying a contrary conclusion.402 
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Furthermore, the case studies they cite to support this observation involve health-based
regulation that is supposed to be much more stringent than regulation governed by BAT
and its feasibility principle.  See id. at 175 n. 8.  This suggests that their argument involves
a broad-side at all standard-setting not involving emissions trading, the focus of their
article, even though they frame it in terms of a feasibility-based standard-setting provision.
Whatever the problems BAT creates for priority setting, Ackerman and Stewart might
agree that “unfettered CBA” would be worse.  Id. at 194.      
403 See Houck, supra note 78, at 428 (science should help determine priorities for
pollution control expenditures).
404 See Driesen, supra note 122, at 10018-19.
405 For reviews of much of the relevant law see Driesen, supra note 122, at 10005-
10008; John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants,
21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
406 See Driesen, supra note 122, at 10004 (noting that regulatory reformers do not
discuss existing  priority setting mechanisms).
407 See Bryner, supra note 380, at  1 (70 percent of Americans believe that
requirements cannot be too stringent and that improvements must be made regardless of
cost).
408 See generally S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 16 (1970), reprinted in COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS, 93RD  CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF
(continued...)
Analysis of science should play a role in priority setting, and it
does.403  Rejection of CBA does not imply rejection of some comparative
assessment of risk in deciding which problems to attack first or the
consideration of scientific data in deciding whether a problem is worth
addressing at all.404  Existing statutory provisions governing priority
setting provide for consideration of the magnitude of harms in choosing
priorities, but they do not require CBA.405  Regulatory reformers ignore
these provisions when they write as if the relevant choices involved CBA
and an utter failure to consider data.406  This impression is wholly
misleading.
D.  Democracy and Rationality.
I have already noted that the democratic arguments advanced for
CBA seem odd, since Sunstein, especially, clearly views CBA as a
counter-majoritarian check on government responses to an irrational
public.  By contrast, the public wants at least all feasible measures to be
taken to protect the environment.407 
The legislative history of relevant statutes suggest strongly that
Congress put the feasibility principle in place to reconcile important
public values.408  The political debates in Congress ring with enthusiasm
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1970, at 401, 416 (1974) (discussing New Source Performance Standards); 116 CONG. REC.
37, 340 (1970), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR, 92ND CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
ACT OF 1970, at 432 (statement of Senator Williams) (explaining that OSHA requires
consideration of full health protection and feasibility); 116 CONG. REC. 36,533 (1970),
reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 92ND
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1970,
at 393-94 (1971) (statement of Senator Pell) (describing OSHA as balancing worker and
employee interests).
409 116 CONG. REC. 32,906 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE  CLEAN
AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 240 (1971) (statement of Senator Griffin) (suggesting
concern that standards for automobiles plays “economic roulette” with millions of jobs);
116 CONG. REC. 32,906-07 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE  CLEAN
AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 240 (1971) (statement of Senator Muskie) (arguing that
public health was of prime importance, but that industry should come back to Congress
if standards prove impossible to meet); 116 CONG. REC. 36,511-12 (1970), reprinted in
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 92ND CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1970, at
321-22 (1971) (statement of Senator Saxbe) (while we “want . . . safe work conditions”,
we must keep an eye on employer’s competitiveness lest we deprive workers of their
jobs).
410 See McGarity, supra note 82, at 2355 (ordinary people would find the arcane
debates about how to value human life in dollar terms “more than a bit bizarre.”).
411 Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
(continued...)
for protecting public health and the environment, but also evince concern
that regulation not produce significant unemployment.409  Whatever one
may think of the foibles of elected officials, they owe their office, at least
in part, to their understanding of public desires.  So, the constant public
discussion of the imperative of protection public health and the
environment, coupled with expressions of concern about job loss may
well capture the most important public values bearing upon the tradeoffs
in environmental regulation.  
If people believe that the law should allow people to die when the
costs of preventing it “outweigh” the monetized value a bureaucrat or
economist assigns to the death, then a cost-benefit criterion would reflect
a democratic decision.  And CBA would provide a means of reaching the
cost-benefit based decisions.  Nobody except economists, corporate
regulatory affairs people, and some other policy professionals believes in
this sort of technocratic monetization as an appropriate guide to policy.410 
Republican strategist Frank Lutz advised Congressional allies not to refer
to CBA in discussing environmental policy with the public, because, he
pointed out, this is a concept of corporations, not ordinary people.411  The
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Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 223 (1996) (“benefit-
cost analysis is neither necessary nor sufficient for designing public policy”).  The authors
went on to urge consideration of available CBA without requiring agencies to abide by a
strict cost-benefit test.  Id. 
412 See McGarity, supra note 1, at 18-19 (equating transparency with disclosure of
policy basis for assumptions undergirding risk assessment). 
413 See McGarity, Oversight, supra note 152, at 156-68; Cf. Olson, supra note 398, at
52-53 (while executive order 12,291 establishes CBA as the criteria for OMB review,
critics charge that OMB only considers regulatory costs).
suggestion that a cost-benefit criterion aids democracy seems quite
strange.  And the suggestion that CBA absent democratic adoption of a
cost-benefit criterion aids democracy appears even stranger.
1.  Transparency. – Cost-benefit proponents claim that CBA aids
transparency.  On the surface, the claim that any analysis would aid
transparency seems off the mark.  Disclosure of analysis aids
transparency, if the analysis played a role in the decision-making.412 
Undisclosed analysis would not aid transparency; nor would disclosure of
analysis that played no role in a decision.  But disclosure of analysis that
played a role in a decision would aid transparency regardless of the form
of analysis; disclosure of either CBA or feasibility analysis can aid
transparency.  So the claim that CBA aids transparency cannot justify a
choice between feasibility analysis and CBA.
  Disclosure of analysis that plays no role in a decision would do
little to aid transparency.  Thus, even the modest position that disclosed
CBA might aid transparency requires some qualification.  Current
implementation of the feasibility principle may suffer from a lack of
transparency, precisely because of the mismatch between analysis and
criterion that the demand for CBA produces.  While an agency must
justify decisions taken under feasibility mandates in terms of feasibility,
cost-benefit considerations will generally govern its negotiations with the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).413  Thus, one cannot be sure
that the announced basis for a decision coincides with the actual basis.  If
the agencies carried out no CBA and nobody demanded explanations for
decisions in cost-benefit terms, this problem would vanish and
transparency would increase.  
Alternatively, one could abandon the uncertainty of the claim that
CBA should be “considered” (a non-transparent position, by the way,
since it does not disclose how it should influence decisions), and adopt
the presumptive position that a cost-benefit criterion should usually
control decisions.  This would make the strongest case for the
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414 Cf. Posner, supra note 1, at 1161 (if the cognitive quirks that worry Sunstein “infect
market behavior, the prices on which” CBA “depends will not” dependably “discipline
thought.”).
415 See Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 182, at 5 (analysis of benefits relies upon
estimates of wage premiums); W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 45-68 (1998).
416 Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 456 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing EPA’s “careful
analysis” of costs in a technology-based rulemaking).
417 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEORGETOWN L. J. 281, 293 (1989) (noting the roots of the legislative supremacy
principle in a social norm of democratic self-government).  
transparency advantages of CBA.  But one would have to compare this
case with the case for feasibility-based regulation based upon feasibility
analysis.  
The numbers in CBA’s “benefits” analysis may have a negative
effect upon transparency.  The public may well think that these numbers
provide the basis for policy, when, in fact, policy decisions generate the
numbers.414  The public, and even some policy makers and academics,
may associate numbers with measurement, not with the sorts of policy
judgment that generate “benefits” estimates for CBA.415   The numerous
policy decisions about the value of human life and other underlying
variables underlying any CBA will only be transparent if disclosed and
fully debated.  The numbers in CBA indirectly express policy judgments
that might appear as objective truths to the public. 
More could be said about the relative transparency of CBA and
alternative modes of analysis.  But I have said enough to demonstrate that
advocates of CBA have not explained why CBA is more transparent than
feasibility analysis or any other form of analysis.  Indeed, the regulatory
reform literature gives the impression that the choice involved in deciding
about CBA is a choice between analysis and no analysis.  This is clearly
wrong.  Agencies engage in analysis with or without CBA.416
2.  Democratic Accountability. – My claim that feasibility analysis
embodies a democratic decision about the distribution of costs suggests
that the feasibility principle provides a good method for political
accountability.  Congress and the President through legislation have made
a highly visible choice in the feasibility provisions about how to consider
the distribution of costs.  In public debate about these provisions they
have defined reasonable regulation as stringent protection of health and
the environment tempered by feasibility constraints aimed at protecting
jobs.  The public can hold the legislators and President accountable for
these decisions by declining to elect them.417    
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By contrast, advocates of CBA frequently envision unelected
executive branch officials or even judges imposing a requirement that
cost not exceed benefits, absent special justification.  Presumably, the
executive branch officials will decide what sorts of distributional
concerns count as special justification.  Such low level administrative
decisions usually attract little notice in newspapers, and may have very
little influence upon elections, especially since Congressmen can  claim
credit for or disavow any controversial decisions as they wish.  
Some regulatory reformers support Congressional legislation
creating a presumption against regulations with costs exceeding
benefits.418  This proposal likewise does not indicate when the
presumption should be overcome.  This proposal consigns decisions
about what counts as an equitable reason to overcome the results of a
CBA to unelected White House officials.  Any CBA will often consign
decisions to largely unchecked discretion of the officials or private
economists making the policy choices that generate the numbers in the
CBA.419  This bodes less well for political accountability than the
reasonably specific legislative decision found in the feasibility principle.
Under any principle of law, there remains the problem of holding
administrative agencies accountable for following legislative decisions. 
And, in practice, since legislative standards are not determinate, agencies
will exercise some discretion within the bounds of the legislative
decision.
Feasibility analysis provides a way of holding agencies
accountable for conforming to the feasibility mandate.  Agencies that
look at the cost of regulation and discover that the cost would shut down
an entire industry self-police to avoid a transgression of their mandate
and the problems industry can create with the agency’s overseers in
Congress and the White House.420  By the same token, if the agency
carries out a good feasibility analysis, it should have difficulty justifying
a failure to impose stringent regulation would force no shutdowns. 
Agencies retain discretion to decide what constitutes widespread plant
closures, but the feasibility analysis should provide the information
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necessary for Presidential political supervision of this policy choice, if
that is desirable.
CBA would likewise help political officials hold agencies
accountable for conformity with a mandate that costs not exceed benefits. 
Because of the numerous discretionary policy decisions inherent in
deciding what the value of benefits are, this accountability will require
extraordinarily transparent CBA.  Otherwise, it will not exist.         
Eric Posner, however, argues that CBA will facilitate
accountability regardless of legislative policy criteria.421  He argues that
CBA, by providing “full information,” would allow public officials to
decide what agency actions are in the official’s best interests.422  This
argument relies on a political accountability model that abandons the goal
of a rule of law for administrative decision-making.423  This argument
might count as a good normative argument if one wants officials to shape
administrative decisions to their individual interests, but appears less
convincing if we want agencies held accountable for conforming to fairly
specific decisions made visibly in Congress.  The constitutional duty to
“take care that the law be faithfully executed”424 would seem to raise
questions about a model that allowed executive branch officials to make
ad hoc decisions about what outcome they favor for their own reasons.  If
we hold to the rule of law ideal, than the regulatory analysis should
analyze the factors that the applicable legal rule makes relevant, not all
factors.  Congress often makes policy decisions by legislatively limiting
the factors an agency may consider.425   
While abandoning the rule of law ideal for administrative law will
help Posner’s argument, it may not suffice.  Professor Posner’s argument
sounds in public choice theory.426  The public official desires reelection
and will therefore tend to choose the decision that will help her get
reelected.  For this reason, Posner’s argument looks best if treated as an
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argument for direct democracy for each decision, rather than democracy
mediated through meaningful legal principles covering a range of cases. 
The notion of direct electoral response to administrative decisions
overlooks the low visibility nature of many of these decisions, but may
work for some high visibility cases. Posner, however, does not explain
why analysis of any kind matters very much to an official viewing each
administrative decision as an opportunity to maximize future performance
at the polls.  An agency can identify the stakeholders in a regulatory
decision without CBA.  And the official seeking to maximize her
standing with influential stakeholders needs to know how the
stakeholders perceive the stakes and how much influence they might
wield in future elections.  The agency’s perception of costs and benefits
has little relevance.
Eric Posner’s equation of CBA with full information also appears
naive.  Even if the analysis contained all of the assumptions and data that
underlie it, high level decision-makers may not have time to read all of
that.  If decision-makers rely on just the numbers and little more, which
busy top level people may well do, they will be quite poorly informed,
especially about known facts.  And industry can always surprise these
officials with new information or information that EPA considered too
suspect to rely upon, thereby taking advantage of the lack of scientific
and engineering expertise at OMB, a place that economists and political
appointees dominate. 
All of this suggests that CBA may not improve regulatory
accountability at all.210  No reason exists to think that CBA provides for
more accountability than feasibility analysis. 
3. Special Interest Influence. – Regulatory reformers assert that
CBA should lessen special interest influence.  On the surface, it seems
plausible to argue that any form of analysis may lessen special interest
influence.  Posner claims that CBA will ameliorate special interest
pressure by disclosing full information to decision-makers, thus lessening
possibilities for special interests to surprise officials and gain converts. 
Of course, feasibility analysis would have the same effect, lessening the
possibility of surprise about information relevant to a feasibility decision. 
But the point that analysis can lessen surprise does not explain a
preference for CBA over feasibility analysis.
Posner’s argument does not address the problem of special
interest influence over the content of regulatory analysis.  Both feasibility
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analysis and CBA rely upon industry information about technologies and
their cost.427  This has regularly caused overestimation of cost.428 
CBA, however, offers a wealth of opportunities for regulated
industry to manipulate and debate benefits estimates.429  Careful scientific
examination of facts usually does not resolve the issues of how to
quantify a regulation’s impact on life, health, and the environment.430  But
debating the relevant issues of risk assessment and economic
methodology generally requires enormous technical sophistication.431 
Industry can bring many more hired experts to the table than either
environmental groups or government.432  Indeed, industry employs more
toxicologists than either the government or universities.  Thus, industry
enjoys a great advantage in manipulating benefits numbers under an
approach emphasizing CBA.  Regulatory reform advocates typically
ignore the scholarship documenting this problem.
Regulatory reformers view the public interest in environmental
protection as a “special interest.”433  CBA does minimize public influence
over regulatory decisions.  It makes the decision-making so complex and
the potential for delay so enormous that the process tends to overwhelm
the resources of environmental organizations, who have many fewer
professionals and much smaller consulting budgets than industry.434 
Cost-benefit regulation has been the norm for many years under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Federal Insecticide Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).435  The experience under these statutes
shows that industry can and does paralyze agencies that must resolve
hundreds of technically complex issues that cannot be resolved in a
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clearly defensible way under a cost-benefit criterion.436  Of course, a
failure to regulate produces a complete victory for the industry.  CBA
reduces the influence of advocates of the public interest in environmental
protection, but enhances the influence of regulated companies.437  It
certainly does not provide more insulation from special interest influence
than feasibility analysis.  
Both CBA and feasibility analysis can reduce the influence of
public hysteria on environmental decision-making.  The feasibility
analysis brings the costs of regulation to the fore just as much as CBA
does, and the feasibility principle restrains regulation, preventing shut
downs that Sunstein’s hysterical public might demand.  Since CBA can
paralyze regulatory systems, surely CBA proponents are right to suggest
that CBA responds more thoroughly to any problems rooted in public
hysteria than the existing regulatory system.  The problem is that it also
throttles response to legitimate public concerns not rooted in hysteria.
Industry generally supports CBA and environmentalists generally
oppose it.  While CBA can be defended (if this is a defense) as
minimizing environmentalist influence on administrative decision-
making, the suggestion that it reduces industry influence is utterly
specious.438  By portraying CBA as minimizing special interest influence
generally, advocates of CBA create a very misleading picture of
neutrality.439  The major new point here is that other forms of analysis can
reduce special interest influence at least as effectively as CBA.
4.  Rationality and Ad Hoc Decision-Making . – The comparison
between the feasibility principle and CBA provides an opportunity to test
regulatory reformers’ suggestion that CBA rationalizes decision-making,
while the alternatives to it are invariably ad hoc.  My claim is fairly
simple.  All forms of analysis and reasoning fail to make the reasons for
precise decisions about environmental regulation wholly obvious and
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transparent.  Likewise, all forms of analysis can become less ad hoc
through adoption of standardized assumptions, albeit at the cost of
becoming less responsive to context.    Regulatory reformers’ suggestion
that CBA produces less ad hoc and more rational regulation than
available alternatives collapses once one compares it to a concrete
alternative instead of grand generalizations about 1970's
environmentalism.440
Neither the feasibility principle nor a cost-benefit criterion will
determine the outcome of a regulation with precision.  This will hardly
surprise careful students of administrative law, for no verbal criterion of
sufficient generality to govern a variety of cases produces determinate
results.  For this reason, the Supreme Court rightly reversed the District
of Columbia Circuit’s holding that the non-delegation doctrine requires
legislation to set out a determinate principle in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns.441
Advocates of CBA seem to assume that CBA provides some sort
of determinate criterion for decision-making, while feasibility analysis
does not.  But CBA conceived only as a decision-making procedure
provides no guidance at all as to policy outcomes.  Analysis becomes an
input into decision-making and nothing more.
The presumptive position does not provide determinate results
either.442  That position posits that costs must not exceed benefits absent a
persuasive reason why they should.  This does not tell us which of several
options yielding benefits exceeding costs agencies should choose.  It only
presumptively eliminates some options in a few cases.  Furthermore, the
rule does not tell us when distributive and other consequences should
trump the conclusion that costs exceed benefits in those few cases where
the presumptive position might eliminate some options.  
The feasibility principle provides much clearer guidance than this,
even though it also conforms to the rule that no verbal formula can
determine the results in all cases.  As I have explained, in the many cases
where available controls would not cost so much as to shut down
facilities, it tells the agency to maximize pollution reductions, which is in
principal somewhat determinate.  It also issues a clear command not to
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shut down entire industries.  Unlike the presumptive position, the
feasibility principle provides meaningful bounds to decision-making
respecting not only maximum stringency, but also minimum stringency.
This analysis, however, gives the presumptive position too much
credit by assuming that it at least presumptively limits the stringency of
regulation.  Cass Sunstein has conceded that CBA by itself is completely
devoid of content.  CBA, in principle, is radically indeterminate.443  If one
values a human life as infinite (by applying willingness accept criteria to
perfect information), then CBA performs as an overly elaborate analysis
leading to a wholly health protective result, at least in cases of predicted
death.  If one assumes that humans consume resources in excess of their
value, then no environmental protection should exist.  The valuation
methodologies determine the results.  And thus defense of CBA as a
general construct is meaningless.
Even if one just accepts the prevailing valuation methodologies as
given, however, the presumptive position remains indeterminate.  The
National Academy of Sciences has recommended that risk assessments
present a range of values to reflect the uncertainties pervading risk
assessment.  In practice, this range is usually so large that it fails to
significantly narrow the possible outcomes.444  Indeed, Cass Sunstein
concedes that a wide benefits range “does not do a great deal to discipline
judgment.”445  And experts in the area have demonstrated that a very wide
benefits range is the norm, not the exception.446
Regulatory reformers lament the inconsistencies they see in
existing regulatory decisions.  They claim that CBA offers a cure.  In
order to make that claim appear plausible, they posit new and improved
CBA.  The CBA gains consistency through generic decisions regarding
the value of human life, the appropriate modeling assumptions, and other
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key variables.447  But feasibility analysis can gain more consistency
through standardizing assumptions as well.  One can solve the problem of
not knowing how many plant shutdowns involve widespread shutdowns
by choosing a percentage of shutdowns to tolerate.  In both cases, of
course, standardization encounters obstacles.  It’s not always clear that a
standardized solution makes sense in all cases and the choices made in
standardization decisions can prove very contentious and difficult.448 
Any form of analysis can become more consistent through adoption of
standardized assumptions.
Selection of a single approach to extrapolation of benefits
estimates from limited data, however, conflicts with the key National
Academy of Science recommendation for producing transparent
scientifically honest analysis - reporting of benefit ranges with
identification of the key assumptions that could influence outcomes.449 
Feasibility analysis can become more consistent without having to give
up honest analysis, since the standardization of the number of tolerated
plant closures would be a pure policy decision that does not purport to
summarize facts.  So, standardization of feasibility analysis offers more
promise for honest government.  
More fundamentally, by comparing new and improved CBA to
the current regulatory system with all of its foibles, regulatory reformers
repeat an error Howard Latin flagged long ago, comparison of ideal
efficiency to existing systems.450  The proper analysis either clarifies
theory by idealizing both approaches or pragmatically considers the
foibles of both approaches symmetrically.
Regulatory reformers have not begun to explain why a cost-
benefit criterion, let alone CBA, would solve the problem of inconsistent
regulatory results better than the relatively clear feasibility principle. 
This matters, because claims of inconsistent regulatory results motivate
substantially all of the soft CBA school’s advocacy for CBA.
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Even if CBA does not cure the inconsistencies that motivate the
call for it, perhaps it can aid in better explanation of decisions.  The soft-
CBA schools assumes that environmental decision-making is irrational,
and that CBA must therefore be better. 
No reasoning supporting the choice of a numerical regulatory
limit under a statutory verbal standard can prove wholly satisfactory. 
One might be able to explain why a superhighway has a speed limit of 65
miles per hour (mph) and not 5 mph.  But the explanation of why the
limit is not 70 mph or 60 mph will always be less than wholly clear.  No
agency can convincingly explain why it decided to forego the added
safety of a 60 mph limit or the added convenience of a 70 mph limit. 
This might help justify the law confining courts to arbitrary and
capricious review of agency actions, instead of asking judges to
determine whether the agency is right; and the judicial gloss of
heightened deference to agencies in the case of highly technical
rulemakings.451
CBA generally provides no means of satisfactorily explaining any
level of regulation, because it provides no means of rationally explaining
how to balance costs with unquantified benefits.  Most ecological and
many health effects resist quantification altogether.452  Regulatory
reformers recognize this and urge agencies to consider them anyway.  No
regulatory reformer, however, has ever explained how an agency is to
justify in a non-arbitrary manner the judgment that a non-quantifiable
effect outweighs (or does not outweigh) a given cost.  Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA453 illustrates the problem.  This case overruled EPA’s
asbestos ban, which addressed one of the most obvious public health
disasters we have ever faced.454  The Proof Fittings court concluded that
the agency’s decision to give the non-quantifiable effect of asbestosis a
significant weight in its decision rendered its rulemaking arbitrary and
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capricious.455  We now know from subsequent jury awards that the value
of this unquantifiable benefit is enormous.456  If the agency cannot
quantify the number of asbestosis cases, how can it explain why the
benefit justifies the costs its regulatory analysis reveals?  And for that
matter, how can EPA (or the court) justify a decision to give up the ban if
a serious health effect has an unknown magnitude?  In fact, one can view
both the court and EPA’s decision as arbitrary.  Since data limitations
preclude quantification of almost all environmental effects and many
health effects of great importance, this poses a serious problem.     
CBA disguises many other issues of rational justification for
benefits estimates.  Perhaps the most difficult involves choosing among
all of the risk assessment assumptions.  These sorts of decisions have no
firm scientific basis and will therefore require very subtle and difficult
policy judgment that agencies will have difficulty explaining.457  In
practice, agencies may have difficulty justifying particular estimates of
the number of deaths and illnesses avoided by a particular regulation in
light of large data gaps.458    
Cass Sunstein suggests that agencies have much more difficulty
coping with judicial review under a cost-benefit approach than they do
under a feasibility approach.459  This might suggest that agency decisions
under a cost-benefit criterion will be more arbitrary (if agencies reach
decisions at all) than decisions under a feasibility standard.  After all, a
ruling upholding a decision suggests that the reasoning, it not completely
convincing, was at least non-arbitrary.  And the ruling in Corrosion Proof
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Fittings would suggest that non-arbitrary decisions under CBA might
often prove impossible.460
Proponents of soft CBA have given no reason to suspect that CBA
or their cost-benefit criterion outperforms feasibility analysis in terms of
rationality or consistency.  Comparing CBA to feasibility analysis and
considering specific concrete statutory criteria makes the failure of the
reformers’ analysis apparent.461
E.  Absolutism
The foregoing discussion should establish that one cannot justify
CBA as a rejection of absolutism, at least as a substitute or supplement to
technology-based standards.462  The feasibility principle already embraces
substantial constraints that reflect a lack of absolute dedication to
immediate achievement of full health protection.
This article establishes that the feasibility principle involves a
Congressionally chosen balance between competing concerns about costs
and benefits.463  But it does so in a way that relieves the agencies from the
responsibility to constantly rebalance.
This leaves open the issue of whether CBA should supplant
health-based standards that do not involve consideration of costs.  While
that issue lies beyond this article’s scope, I have discussed that issue
elsewhere.464  Of course, rejection of health-based standards cannot
justify choosing CBA over the feasibility principle.
The issue of how and when to take costs into account poses
difficult issues. Proponents of soft CBA do not set out clear ideas about
how to resolve these issues.  Ultimately, they punt and assign the
resolution of these issues to bureaucrats.  These issues are hard enough
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for elected representatives to resolve.  The view that bureaucrats should
resolve the key issues of when and how to consider costs not only seems
profoundly anti-democratic, it also offers a recipe for either paralysis or
wide-ranging ad hoc decisions.
F.  Comprehensive Calibration
Comprehensive consideration of everything does not provide a
mechanism for finely calibrated administrative decisions.465  Yet,
regulatory reformers implausibly suggest that agencies consider
everything through CBA, and that this consideration will somehow
discipline and add coherence to agency decisions.  
A radically indeterminate position, that one consider CBA can, in
theory, accommodate the distributional concerns at the heart of the
feasibility approach.  (Indeed, it could accommodate any theory of the
good life one could mention).  Nothing prevents a decision-maker from
giving plant closures substantial weight under a cost-benefit approach. 
But the indeterminate position does not address distributional concerns or
any other normative concern in a clear way.466
The presumptive position does not address the distributional
concern as well as the feasibility principle either.  For the presumptive
position assumes that the magnitude of costs generally dictates the
presumptive result, when the distributional issue is more important, by
far, than questions of aggregate costs and benefits.  
But the more profound problem with this response involves a
failure to cope with the democratic theory problems with the cost-benefit
position.  Congress should make key decisions about distributional issues,
like whether agencies should countenance widespread plant closures and
whether they should allow preventable concentrated harms to continue in
more run-of-the-mill situations.  Assigning administrative agencies the
responsibility to play God, not only to decree the value of human life, but
also to measure “overall well-being,” and then to determine whether
distributional or deontological issues has primacy makes no sense.467 
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Government agencies cannot effectively engage in such open-ended
policy-making, and should not.468  Unlike elected representatives, they
know little about public “desires.”  Absent some clear affirmative
decision-making by Congress, agencies must not only exercise some
troubling discretion and engage in difficult technical analysis, it must
revisit fundamental political value issues with each decision.  Supervision
by scientifically ignorant OMB economists trained to value efficiency
over everything the public really values only makes this problem worse,
not better.469  We elect people to make at least clear general policy
decisions, not to pass them on to agencies.
Even a Congressional decision to choose the presumptive position
does not constitute a clear position.  People want to know, did Congress
favor environmental protection or not?  And if it adopted a more nuanced
position, what limits did it place on pursuing environmental objectives. 
The feasibility principle addresses these questions forthrightly; the
presumptive position supplies a general framework disguising radical
indeterminancy and delegation of key decision-making to unelected
technocrats.
CBA appears more rational to some, because they imagine that it
uses assessment of the magnitude of risk to calibrate a proportional
response.  The feasibility principal alone does not use risk assessment-
based calibration.  The analysis provided above, however, casts doubt
upon the desirability, feasibility, and even the coherence of such
calibration.  If one knows from the distribution of costs and the sorts of
harms involved that the benefits of regulation qualitatively outweigh the
costs (as one does, when the feasibility principle is not triggered), then
seeking to quantify the value of harms involves a huge waste of
resources.  This waste also involves a serious opportunity cost, because
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Resolution of Science Policy Questions:  Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
GEORGETOWN L. J. 729, 736-37 (1979) (discussing effects of delay on health).
471 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(a),(b).
people die and get ill and ecosystems decline, sometimes irretrievably,
while the debate about proper valuation goes on.470  
Furthermore, the huge error band in risk assessment and the
existence of important, but wholly unquantifiable, health and
environmental consequences means that proportional calibration is
impossible.  For ambient pollution, the problem of calibration loses
coherence when applied to most standard-setting, because the magnitude
of the risk shifts with factors other than the pollution from targeted plants.
  Of course, some rough calibration is possible and goes on all the
time, even without CBA.  Congress phases out some pollutants, rather
than subjecting them to a feasibility principle.471  And, conversely,
Congress and agencies decline to regulate pollutants that pose no
significant risk.  But calibration proportional to risk in each rulemaking
undertaken makes no sense, once the problem is properly understood. 
And CBA proponents have not explained how a cost-benefit criterion
calibrates response even in principle, for the criterion of benefits
exceeding costs does not tell us anything about minimum stringency. 
Finally, once one recognizes, as the soft CBA scholars do, that
distribution of costs matters, then we need a political decision about how
to take this into account.  The feasibility principle provides this, the
CBA-based prescriptions do not.          
A full comparison of CBA to the analysis undergirding findings of
significant risk, existing priority setting outside the CBA framework, and
health-based standard setting lies beyond the scope of this article.  But
this article’s analysis has important implications for that debate.  First of
all, because consideration of scientific information bearing upon risk
preceded the introduction of CBA into the system, the health-based (or
effects-based) alternative to CBA involves analysis of relevant science. 
Second, evaluation of CBA must compare it to analysis undergirding
existing risk-based decisions that do not involve CBA.  Third, that
evaluation must idealize both forms of decisions to clarify theory or
compare the foibles of both symmetrically to clarify good pragmatic
judgments.  Fourth, this consideration must take into account the
problems of scale involving differences between marginal analysis and
analysis of overall risks that reflect interactions of chemicals in the
environment.  Thus, this article contains important lessons for other
aspects of the regulatory reform debate.
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V.  CONCLUSION
None of the advocates of soft CBA have explained why one
should prefer CBA to the feasibility principle.  The feasibility principle
provides a reasonable, democratic choice about how to consider the
distribution of cost.  It ingeniously manages a balance between costs and
benefits without requiring agencies to engage in extraordinarily
problematic comparisons between values that are never objectively and
reliably quantifiable.
More generally, the regulatory reformers’ arguments about the
value of CBA collapse when they must confront a real alternative.  Far
too often, they have written as if the alternative to CBA is no analysis at
all.  But the regulatory system always involved substantial analysis,
serious  consideration of cost, evaluation of relevant science, and a set of
mechanisms to set priorities.  We should welcome responsible proposals
to improve any of these features.  But framing the debate as one between
absolutism and rationality grossly distorts what is at stake, and makes it
easy to prescribe medicine worse than the disease.
